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INTRODUCTION
As this Introduction is completed, a single news story has dominated
the newspapers and networks for the last few weeks: the granting of
permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) to China, a necessary step to
its admission in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Lobbying on
behalf of granting PNTR, the Clinton administration and a range of
business interests have swarmed over Capitol Hill, eagerly describing
vast new markets for goods. The key opponent of the legislation has
been organized labor, gravely depicting the consequences of vast new
opportunities for low-cost production. Perhaps surprisingly, organized
labor's public opposition to PNTR has been premised not on loss of jobs
in the United States but on concerns over core labor rights. As AFL-CIO
President John Sweeney has declared, "until there is freedom of speech
and freedom of association in China, until there is freedom of religion
and freedom to join unions in China, there can be no permanent free
trade agreement with China."'
Despite the media's current obsession with China and PNTR, if one
looks back over the last decade this latest political clash seems little dif-
ferent from the charged debate in 1992 over NAFTA, in 1995 over
approval of the Uruguay Round, in 1998 over fast track authority for
President Clinton, and last November in the Seattle WTO ministerial
negotiations over a millennial trade round. The conflict will likely be
joined once again in a few short years when the Free Trade Area of the
1. Carter Young, In the Bag? Odd Coalition Pushes China Trade Deal Toward Passage,
ABCNews.com, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/PNTR000522.html (May
22, 2000). One might question whether labor's core concern is solidarity with Chinese workers
rather than the potential loss of U.S. jobs, but at a basic level the two meld into the same call
for level playing fields as a precondition for PNTR. Amidst electioneering drama prior to the
final vote, the House of Representatives ended up comfortably approving PNTR by a vote of
237 to 197. Ian Christopher McCaleb, House Approves China Trade Pact, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/05/24/china.trade/index.html "(May 24,
2000).
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Americas agreement comes up for a vote. Each of these clashes has con-
cerned a superficially different issue, perhaps, but the net effect has been
a variation on a common theme. Each has featured the same antagonists
and the same overarching concern: the destabilizing social effects of
globalization.
The almost blinding pace of trade and investment growth over the
last decade, driven by concerted international efforts to remove domestic
barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capital, has brought about an
unprecedented global marketplace. To be sure, the potential of growing
international commerce remains alluring. With increased generation of
wealth, it stands to reason that living standards will improve as well.
Witness the familiar refrain of trade advocates and the Clinton admini-
stration that a rising tide lifts all boats. But increased economic activity
can come at a social cost, as well, ranging from job loss and depressed
wages to lower levels of labor, environmental and social protections.3
Thus, coincident with growing global markets has been a growing
concern of groups within civil society over the social impacts of eco-
nomic liberalization. As realization of the scope of potential costs has
increased, environmental, labor, and other citizen groups have either
directly opposed further economic liberalization or, as a complementary
strategy, stepped up calls for explicit linkage between economic liberali-
zation and protection of public interests . Hence, labor and
2. It certainly has been a spring tide in the United States. As U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky contends,
[T]he opening of world markets has helped spark a 55% expansion of American
goods and services exports since 1992, to a record total of $958.5 billion last
year.... [W]e have seen $2.1 trillion in economic growth, during the longest eco-
nomic expansion in American history; the creation of nearly 21 million new jobs; a
$400 billion expansion in our manufacturing industry; wages for non-supervisory
workers up 6.5%; and broadly shared benefits, with poverty rates at the lowest lev-
els since 1979, and unemployment touching 4% in January, with record lows for
women, African-Americans and Hispanics.
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Policy and
the Trading System, Address at the Brandeis University Graduate School of International
Economics and Finance (Apr. 13, 2000), available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-
testlbarshefsky/barshefsky_79.pdf, at 5 (last modified Apr. 18, 2000).
3. For a broad-ranging view on the threats posed by globalization, see Russell Mokhiber
and Robert Weissman, 10 Reasons to Dismantle the WTO, at http://www.infoshop.org
/octo/wto_reasons.html (last modified Dec. 10, 1999).
4. Lawrence Krause & Joseph Nye, Reflections on the Economics and Politics of Inter-
national Economic Organizations, 29 INT'L ORG. 323, 325 (1975) ("As the integration of
markets has progressed, immobile groups in societies, including large segments of labor, have
pressed for governmental protection to redress their relative disadvantage in the competition
with transnationally mobile competitors."). A large number of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have called for a new approach to globalization that looks beyond increased com-
merce, but there is a significant difference in tactical approaches. Some NGOs have called for
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environmental side agreements have been created as part of the NAFTA
deal to provide a strategic social counterweight to the growth in com-
merce promised by pro-trading interests. The need for and appropriate
breadth of safeguards have become key issues in both domestic and in-
ternational fora, determining the extent to which international regulatory
regimes explicitly create protections against encroachment on labor, so-
cial or environmental values.
In the labor context, this debate has focused on whether liberaliza-
tion requires corresponding protection of labor rights and, if so, for
which rights and at what level of protection. The broad landscape of the
trade-labor conflict is well known, and has been much discussed.6 In ex-
ploring the promotion of labor rights by international governmental
institutions (IGOs), scholars have largely focused on the International
Labor Organization (ILO), the WTO, and the European Union. Such a
focus is entirely fitting, for it is here that many of the priorities are set,
rights articulated, linkages fixed, and protections created.
In this well-trodden field of study, though, another key IGO player
has been overlooked. Little scholarly consideration has been given to the
role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). Perhaps this inattention is to be expected since, in contrast to
IGOs in the U.N. system, the ILO, or the WTO, the OECD has been a
remarkably low-profile institution. In the United States, few people
know the organization exists much less what it does. Even those who
know of the OECD focus on its well-known activities in economic
spheres, rarely thinking of its role in relation to social issues, much less
to labor rights Indeed, there is remarkably little focused political sci-
8ence or legal scholarship on the OECD as an institution in any context.
the dismantling of the WTO and international financial institutions (such as the anarchists in
the website cited above), while the international labor movement has taken a more pragmatic
reform approach focusing on the need to re-structure trade and investment agreements.
5. For a history of the NAFTA side agreements, see DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN,
& DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1245-58 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the
World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 565 (1987); Janelle
Diller & David Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment Toward the Harmonization of In-
ternational Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663 (1997); Laura Ho, Catherine Powell, & Leti Volpp,
(Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights
and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383 (1996).
7. The one area in which notice has been taken of the OECD and labor rights has been
the OECD Guidelines. See discussion infra Section II.A. The focus there, though, has been on
the text and interpretation of the Guidelines rather than the structure and institutional capacity
of the OECD.
8. Andrew Moravcsik's study of the OECD Export Credit Arrangement provides an ex-
cellent analysis of negotiations conducted at the OECD, but his focus is on regime formation
and maintenance rather than on the OECD, itself. Andrew Moravcsik, Disciplining Trade
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This oversight is unfortunate because the OECD has played, and
continues to play, an important role in shaping the architecture of global
governance not only in international commerce but in non-economic
domains, as well. This has been achieved through directed research,
lawmaking, and, less directly, through the creation of communities of
influence that set the agendas of international policy. In assessing the
growth of transgovernmental networks, for example, Professor Anne-
Marie Slaughter has predicted that, in stark contrast to the U.N. constel-
lation of institutions, "[t]he next generation of international institutions
is .. . likely to look more like the Basel Committee [composed of 12
central bank governors] or, more formally, the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, dedicated to providing a forum
for transnational problem-solving and the harmonization of national
law."9 Surely an organization that potentially sets the standard for the
next generation of IGOs warrants serious study.
This Article has four sections. The first recounts the history of the
OECD, from its creation as the overseer of the Marshall Plan' ° to its cur-
rent prominence as global economic analyst, and explains its operations.
The second section explores its influence on the development of labor
rights, examining the well-known OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, publications on trade and labor by the Employment, Labor
and Social Affairs Directorate, and the events surrounding South Ko-
rea's accession to the OECD. Each of these activities, though quite
different from one another (and, in combination, very different from the
activities of other IGOs), provided important spurs to the articulation
and development of core labor rights. Part III presents a detailed case
study of the failed negotiations at the OECD over the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI). The case study provides insight both
into an important event in the march toward globalization and into the
role the OECD can meaningfully play in formally linking trade and labor
rights.
While the OECD's reports, recommendations, and decisions have
been discussed in a wide range of scholarship, little has been written on
Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173 (1989). Rob Housman's
1994 article briefly discusses the restrictions on NGO participation at the OECD. Robert F.
Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699,
716-18 (1994).
9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
at 183, 196 (1997).
10. The Marshall Plan was a financial assistance package from America to restore the
economic infrastructure of Europe following World War II. See Economic Cooperation Act of
1948 (Marshall Plan), Pub. L. No. 80-472, 62 Stat. 137, available at http://
www.nara.gov/exhall/featured-document/marshall/marshall.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
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the institution itself. The different empirical analyses in Parts I, II, and
III combine to inform the institutional analysis in Part IV and its find-
ings are relevant to the range of the OECD's activities, from
environmental protection and trade to agriculture and transport policy. In
reviewing instances in which the OECD has proved most effective and
assessing its relative strengths and weaknesses in comparison to com-
peting IGOs, this section draws from international relations scholarship
and focuses on the OECD's two distinguishing assets-its role in creat-
ing communities of influence and its influence as a conditional agenda-
setter.
The concluding section considers the future of the OECD, proposing
how it can better meet the twin challenges posed by globalization-
OECD membership and meaningful engagement of civil society. It is
hoped that the Article's exploration of the OECD's influence on labor
rights will provide a broad foundation for future work on other aspects
of the institution, informing research on the operations, capacity, and
potential of the OECD in a very different world than one envisaged by
the organization's architects over fifty years ago.
I. THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. History of the OECD
The predecessor to the OECD, the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation (OEEC), was created in April 1948 amid the rubble
of World War II's devastation. The OEEC was explicitly charged with
the administration of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe.
Housed in the Chateau de la Muette in Paris with representatives from its
founding 18 Member countries," the OEEC's name expressed well the
organization's goals-the promotion of cooperation and commerce
among Europe's reconstructed economies, development of a European
customs union, and, ultimately, a free trade area.
The OEEC's initial work focused on the effective allocation of the
Marshall Plan's grants and credits. Under pressure from the Americans
and mindful of the escalating tariffs and protectionism that had
11. These countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, Western Germany, and the Anglo-American Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste.
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD's Origins: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1948-1961, at http://www.oecd.org/about/
origins/oeec.htm (last modified Sept. 29, 2000).
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accompanied the fall in world exports and rise of fascism, Member
countries also agreed to liberalize trade in foodstuffs, manufactured
products, and raw materials. By the end of 1950, agreements reached at
the OEEC had resulted in freeing 60% of private intra-European trade,
rising to 84% in 1955 and 89% in 1959. 2 After the unexpected end of
Marshall Plan aid in 1952, the OEEC remained active by directing its
energies to European economic development and helping lay the
groundwork for the creation of the European Economic Community. It
later created the framework for negotiations to establish the European
Free Trade Area, creating closer commercial ties between the Common
Market members and the other European OEEC members on a
multilateral basis.
It is sometimes said that international organizations are designed to
prevent the last war and, like the Bretton Woods institutions, the OEEC
was created to serve both political and economic ends. 3 Indeed, in the
face of the chilly East-West relations of the Cold War, the OEEC served
an explicitly political role, standing out as the premier international in-
stitution committed to the advocacy and development of free market
policies. With the establishment of the European Economic Communi-
ties in 1957, the original impetus for creation of the OEEC no longer
existed. Europe now had a permanent institution dedicated to forging
closer economic ties. Member countries had found value in the common
forum provided by the OEEC, however, and the Cold War's ideological
battle over centrally controlled versus market economies had grown con-
siderably colder and more hostile. Thus the OEEC Member countries
decided to create a new organization in its place-the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In keeping with its predecessor's mandate, the OECD is first and
foremost an economic organization dedicated to the principles of free
markets. Its founding treaty requires the organization to promote policies
designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and em-
ployment and a rising standard of living in Member
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to
contribute to the development of the world economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as
well as non-Member countries in the process of economic
development; and
12. Id.
13. Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 324.
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(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilat-
eral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with inter-
national obligations.'
4
The OECD's original membership of 21 countries (the founding
Western European members, the United States, Canada, and the key
NATO allies Turkey and Iceland) has expanded to 30 today.'5 The only
legal requirement for membership, apart from unanimous approval of
existing members, is that an applicant must have a market-based econ-
omy.
B. OECD Activities
What does the OECD do? In comparison with other IGOs, it remains
a curious creature. Far from being a Cold War relic, the OECD has de-
veloped into an amalgam of a rich man's club, a management consulting
firm for governments, and a legislative body.
1. Rich Man's Club
The OECD is, first and foremost, an exclusive club whose members
produce two-thirds of the world's goods and services. 6 The OECD pro-
vides a closed setting for wealthy industrialized governments to share
experiences, identify issues of common concern, and coordinate domes-
tic and international policies. In simple terms, the OECD's various
standing intergovernmental committees serve as useful talking shops for
countries to share experiences and learn from one another's successes
and challenges.' 7 While it is not voiced openly, it is important to under-
14. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
15. The Member countries and dates of accessions are: Australia (1971), Austria (1961),
Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland (1969),
France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland
(1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), The
Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961),
Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Slovak Republic (2000), Turkey (1961),
United Kingdom (1961), United States (1961). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Online: Membership, at http://www.oecd.org/aboutgeneral/member-
countries.htm (last modified Sept. 29, 2000).
16. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, What Is OECD?, at
http://www.oecd.org/about/general/index.htm (last modified Sept. 29, 2000) ("The OECD is a
club of like-minded countries. It is rich, in that OECD countries produce two thirds of the
world's goods and services, but it is not an exclusive club.").
17. Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 337 ("With the growth of economic interdependence,
more bureaucracies that were once considered domestic become involved in international
affairs. Many bureaucracies and agencies of governments have similar interests. In some
cases, the similarity of interests is greater across national lines than it is with competing do-
mestic agencies and interests.") (emphasis added).
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stand that many OECD country delegates think of the closed-door
meetings of the OECD as a welcome alternative forum to what is often
viewed as the developing country dominated and politicized United Na-
tions system. The OECD occupies a unique position in the constellation
of IGOs, with membership broader than the EU, Nordic Council, or
NAFTA, yet much more restrictive than the U.N. or WTO, and topic
coverage as broad as any IGO. As a result, the OECD provides a re-
stricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics.'8
2. Management Consulting
The OECD also acts as a high-powered research institution. Its more
than 1,800 employees (many of whom are economists) collect data,
monitor trends, forecast economic developments, and develop policy
options for consideration by Member countries. Its "Economic Outlook"
series, for example, forecasts macroecomonic trends over the next two
years (e.g., GDPs, employment, account balances, and interest rates),
each of which is followed closely by the global financial media. The
OECD's ability to gather and synthesize data on members' policy initia-
tives and results provides a wealth of insight concerning which types of
policies work best in particular settings. Unlike sector-specific IGOs
such as the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO) and others, the OECD's research occurs in virtually all
fields of interest to governments, including trade, environment, agricul-
ture, technology, taxation, education, foreign assistance, and
employment. The result is over 500 books published annually (in addi-
tion to the many reports that are not published).' 9 In most cases, the only
common feature uniting OECD activities in these disparate fields is their
focus on economic impacts. In recent years, research on the impacts of
trade (i.e., trade and environmental protection, trade and labor standards)
has been carried out on a horizontal basis among directorates, including
the Trade Directorate, of course, but also the Directorate for Financial
18. Perhaps one reason the OECD's mandate is so broad is its lack of direct political
power. See infra text accompanying notes 19-20. As Krause and Nye have observed:
It is sometimes said that intergovernmental organizations operate according to "the
law of inverse salience": the greater the political prominence of an issue, the less
the operational autonomy of the organization. This law is sometimes used as a rea-
son for limiting the scope of an organization's domain to a narrow range of issues
that are more likely to be susceptible to technical than to broad political treatment.
Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 335.
19. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD and the Public,
at http://www.oecd.org/about/public/index.htm (last modified Sept. 29, 2000).
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and Fiscal Affairs and the Directorate for Education, Employment, La-
bor and Social Affairs.
Importantly, the OECD's research is purposely conducted on behalf
of Member country government officials, who direct from the outset the
scope of the work with their own domestic policy and legal development
concerns in mind. Their research agendas are often strategic, with do-
mestic agency officials attempting to use the OECD as a fulcrum to
leverage policies in their capitals. 0 Anne-Marie Slaughter's quotation in
the Introduction to this Article refers to just this type of transgovern-
mental coalition building.2
No OECD document may be released publicly without approval by
all the Member countries, a process known as "derestriction." Internal
documents are not publicly available and can therefore be quite explicit
with pointed recommendations and detailed case studies. As a result,
internal drafts may differ from public OECD documents. Derestriction
can sometimes result in lengthy internal negotiations prior to publication
(and some contentious reports are never published). The final product,
though, represents as authoritative a source as one can find in the inter-
national arena. Importantly, and discussed in the context of the Labour
Standards Study in Part II.B., the OECD's published research is widely
regarded as the result of objective analysis and often serves as the basis
for policy debates among opposing groups.
In the field of agriculture, for example, the OECD has become an
authoritative source of independent data. Its reports on members' agri-
cultural policies, their implementation, and reform have strongly
influenced the debates over increasing cross-border liberalization of ag-
20. When I worked in the Environment Directorate, Japan financed a work program on
extended producer responsibility initiatives in the OECD area. It was commonly understood
among the secretariat staff that the Japanese Environment Agency was supporting this re-
search both to learn from other countries' experiences and in order to provide political cover
for the agency's implementation of this policy. For an explanation of extended producer re-
sponsibility, see James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVT'L. L. 1243
(1997).
21. See Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 44 (1974) (arguing that transgovernmental coalition
building "takes place when sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from other
governments against elements of their own administrative structure"); see also discussion
supra note 9.
22. For example, before publishing my OECD book on environmental labeling, JAMES
SALZMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING IN OECD COUNTRIES (1991), the Environment
Committee met and raised concerns that needed to be addressed before granting their ap-
proval. In particular, I had to negotiate the contents with two countries over several weeks
before they agreed to approve derestriction.
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ricultural trade (a key issue in the WTO's millennium round).23 The En-
vironment Directorate, as well, periodically publishes reviews of
Member countries' environmental performance. These country assess-
ments are often critical and can shape the course of national policy
debates. As any lawyer knows, in an argument most of the battle is over
the facts. The OECD's authoritative status often tempers this conflict,
allowing parties to focus more directly on the merits of their respective
positions.24
3. Legislation
Bringing together the wealthy industrialized nations in a private set-
ting and providing high-powered research has led in a number of
instances to negotiation and adoption of international legal instruments.
Article 5 of the OECD's convention provides for Member countries,
through the Council of Ministers, to take three types of legal action:
Recommendations, Decisions, and agreements with other governmental
bodies.
Recommendations are non-binding agreements that generally repre-
sent policy advice with a strong base of support. As a recent example, in
response to the increasing use of information technology to create new
avenues for offshore investment for the purposes of tax avoidance and
evasion, in 1998 the OECD Council adopted two Recommendations to
improve exchange of information between countries, advocating the use
of tax identification numbers and a standard magnetic format for auto-
matic exchange of information.25 Member countries generally use
Recommendations either as a means to influence domestic policy devel-
opment, arguing in their respective capitals that the OECD has endorsed
a particular approach, or as a precursor to a Decision.26
Decisions are legally binding on Member countries. Not
surprisingly, adoption of Decisions is less frequent than adoption of
Recommendations and the negotiations are followed much more closely
23. DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 54-55 (Chatham
House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999).
24. To be sure, this should not be taken to suggest that OECD research is always ac-
cepted as authoritative by interested parties. But it is noteworthy how infrequently OECD
publications are accused of bias or error.
25. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ANNUAL
REPORT, 1998, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, available at http://
www.oecd.org/publications/97-rep/sec-genel .htm (last modified Jan. 14, 2000).
26. While it is rare, the OECD can also adopt a non-binding Declaration (effectively a
high-profile recommendation). This strategy was apparently floated as a response to Mexico's
attempt to block agreement on the Corporate Guidelines (described elsewhere in this Article)
to gain concessions in the last days of negotiations.
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by Member countries. The OECD's recently completed work on bribery
provides a useful example of Recommendations and Decisions at work,
as well as the OECD's role as a rich man's club and management
consultant. In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by consensus a
resolution on "Measures against corrupt practices of transnational and
other corporations, their intermediaries, and others involved." This led to
a draft convention on illicit payments four years later.2 ' The draft
convention was never adopted, however, because developing countries
demanded adoption of stronger corporate codes as a precondition for
their support. As India stated on behalf of the G77, "the UN Conference
on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments [can] be convened
only after completion of the UN Conference on a Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporation., 28 Developed countries opposed the Code of
Conduct and, as a result, neither the code nor the draft convention on
illicit payments were adopted.
It took almost twenty years for the OECD to address the issue di-
rectly, without developing country opposition. Following extensive
discussions amongst Member countries, the OECD adopted Recommen-
dations in 1994, 1996, and 1997 on various aspects of bribery, calling on
Member countries to combat international corruption by making bribery
of foreign public officials a crime, preventing tax deductions for bribes,
prohibiting corruption in contracts funded by development assistance
programs, and creating effective company rules on accounting and
auditing to reveal practices of bribery. In December 1997, the Member
countries and five non-Members agreed to a Decision that made binding
• 30
the steps agreed to in previous Recommendations. Soon after, the U.N.
adopted a declaration against bribery that referred to the OECD and
OAS Conventions and passed a code of conduct for public officials.3'
This ability to reach agreement on issues that IGOs with larger member-
ship have been unable to address meaningfully is a unique strength of
the OECD although, as we shall see in the case of the MAI, it can prove
27. See Conclusions Reached By the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit
Payments, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2nd Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. E/AC.67/L.1
(1979).
28. Transnational Corporations, India Draft Decision, U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil, 2nd Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/1980/C.I/L.22 (1980) (emphasis added).
29. For a discussion of the OECD Guidelines and developed country opposition to the
Code of Conduct, see infra Part II.A.
30. Organisation on Economic Co-operation and Development: Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Arg.-Braz.-
Bulg.-Chile-Slovk., Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1,4 (1998).
31. This history is recounted in Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and
Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Ongoing Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. (forthcoming Oct. 2000).
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a weakness as well. The Convention on Combating Bribery provided for
monitoring by the Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions to ensure full implementation. Acting in its role of man-
agement consultant, the OECD has now published twenty-one country
reports examining the Member countries' progress in implementing the
Convention.32 The ability of the OECD Council of Ministers to enter into
agreements with Member countries, non-Member countries and interna-
tional organizations (as provided in Article (5) of the OECD
Convention) has generally had little relevance to trade-labor linkages.33
Article 6 of the OECD Convention requires consensus for adoption
of Recommendations and Decisions, though members may abstain and
thereby enter the equivalent of a reservation. The practice of closing
meetings to the public and the consensus requirement for Recommenda-
tions and Decisions eliminates much of the acrimony and political
grandstanding in other IGOs such as the UN's General Assembly. If
proponents of a Recommendation or Decision face concerted opposition
from even a few countries, a vote will not be taken until significant ne-
gotiation has produced a text unobjectionable to all the Member
countries. Despite the fact that Decisions are binding, it is exceedingly
rare for any OECD Decision to provide sanctions for noncompliance 4
Taken together, the OECD's recent efforts to draft international
agreements have played a significant role in crafting the emerging ar-
chitecture of global governance. The agreements negotiated at the
OECD to reduce the importance of tax havens, prohibit bribery in inter-
national business transactions, revise codes of conduct for corporate
governance, and create multilateral rules for foreign direct investment
(the aborted MAI) all set in place multilateral rules where weak or non-
existent international limits operated before.
32. Anti-Corruption Unit, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Country Reports, June 27, 2000, http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/report.htm (June 27,
2000).
33. It should be noted, though, that four non-Member countries have acceded to the re-
vised Decision on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which legally obliges them to
set up National Contact Points. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsflLinkTo/c(2000)96-final (June 26-27, 2000). There
are currently three non-Members adhering to the Guidelines: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
The fourth country (the Slovak Republic) has now been accepted as a Member but was not
one when it adopted the Guidelines.
34. The Author is not aware of any Decisions with sanction provisions.
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C. OECD Structure
The overall structure and direction of the OECD is determined by
the annual meeting of the Council at the ministerial level. Decisions and
recommendations are voted on by the OECD Council at the
ambassadorial level, the governing body of Member country
representatives that oversees the work of the organization and meets
twice monthly, more often if necessary. These are ambassadorial
appointments, with one representative from each country as well as the
European Union. The OECD's productive work, however, is carried out
by specialized directorates. The Economics Directorate, for example,
publishes the well-known Economic Outlook reports, which provide data
on economic trends and projecting economic developments. The
Statistics Directorate performs a similar function, collecting economic
statistics from across the OECD on foreign trade, national accounts,
employment, unemployment and other areas. Because all OECD
publications must be derestricted by Member countries prior to
publication, these data are regarded as officially approved. Other
directorates focus on environmental policy, development assistance,
public management, science, technology, and industry, and agriculture. 5
There are three directorates of particular importance to the intersec-
tion of trade and labor rights. The Trade Directorate, as its name
suggests, analyzes trade policies, explores the basis for common posi-
tions, and fleshes out disagreements in advance of future negotiations
under the WTO. The Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise
Affairs (DAFFE) focuses in part on international investment and fi-
nance. It took the lead role in supporting negotiations for the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (discussed infra). The Directorate for Educa-
tion, Employment, Labor and Social Affairs (ELSA) is the primary
directorate concerned with labor issues and employment. It has devel-
oped few recommendations or decisions, placing most of its efforts into
research. 6
Each directorate is governed by a managing committee, composed of
representatives from Member countries. Thus the Environment Director-
ate's committee is drawn from officials of environment ministries and
agencies. Committees, through a one-country one-vote process, deter-
mine the directorate's work program and priorities. Below the
committees are groups and ad hoc groups that oversee the more techni-
cal activities and the work program. As an example, the Environment
35. See Organizational Chart, infra text accompanying note 37.
36. In the 1960s and 1970s, ELSA only issued two recommendations on labor and mar-
ket policy.
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Directorate's main committee, the Environmental Policy Committee,
oversees working groups on waste management policy, transport,
chemicals, pesticides and biotechnology, and others. In all, there are ap-
proximately 200 committees, working groups and expert groups,
involving the combined participation of thousands of senior officials
from Member country governments. Hence, the amount of information
exchange is quite extensive and, importantly, most of these are not di-
rected toward producing decisions or recommendations. Most policy
development remains at the informal level.
There has been a growing practice of interdisciplinary work, as well,
directly involving the secretariat and country representatives of different
directorates. In 1991, the Trade and Environment Directorates, for ex-
ample, created a common working group to examine aspects of the trade
and environment debate. Research on unemployment has brought to-
gether specialists from throughout the OECD, including experts on
macroeconomics, taxation, technology, labor markets, and social policy.
See Organizational Chart on following page.
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The bulk of OECD research, as well as all maintenance and support
of the committees and groups, is carried out by the OECD Secretariat.
There are about 1,850 staff members in Paris, who function as interna-
tional civil servants with no formal affiliation to their native countries.
Traditionally, middle and higher level national civil servants are sup-
posed to work at the OECD for three to five years before returning to
their home countries. This is true for national delegations in practice, but
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many in the Secretariat make their careers at the OECD.37 Roughly 40%
of the Secretariat are economists. While there is no formal quota system
for hiring, there is a clear awareness of country representation in high-
level appointments.38
Like other international governmental organizations, the OECD has
been under pressure to reduce its expenses. Unlike the U.N., however,
the OECD does not lurch from one budget crisis to the next.39 The
budget is the result of annual Member country contributions, calculated
according to the size of its economy. Hence, the United States and Japan
are the two biggest contributors. Member countries also often choose to
support specific work programs and projects of particular interest. The
current OECD budget is about $200 million.
D. BIAC and TUAC
A classic dilemma facing IGOs, and of particular relevance over the
last decade, is how best to interact with nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). If done on a purely ad hoc basis, concerns may arise over spe-
cial avenues of influence and favoritism for chosen NGOs. As will be
addressed in Part III's discussion of the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment, the OECD has been both leader and laggard in its interactions
with civil society, and its experiences are instructive for other IGOs. In
the labor area, the OECD tackled this problem directly through the crea-
tion of two nongovernmental partners: the Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC) and the Business Industry Advisory Committee
(BIAC).
TUAC is the formal representative of labor organizations to the
OECD. As explained above, the OEEC's mission was more than simply
disbursing funds or re-building Europe on the basis of free markets. Its
core mission was equally to preempt support for communism and, for
that matter, the re-emergence of fascism. This required explicit consid-
eration of labor interests.40 It is important to keep in mind that Hungary
and the other Central European countries were brought under Soviet
control during the same period as the creation of the OEEC. With the
annexation of these countries into the Soviet bloc, policy makers became
37. The enticements of a job at the OECD are considerable. Beyond the five weeks of
vacation guaranteed to all French employees and the pleasures of living in Paris, OECD staff
salaries are tax free with generous pensions.
38. There is an informal understanding that a United States official will always serve as
one of the two Deputy Secretaries-General of the organization.
39. Most of the pressure has come from the United States. In response, the staff has been
reduced by 300 people and the budget has been cut 10% for the next three years. Christopher
Adams, Think-Tank Rethinks Its Role, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 1999, at iv.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
Michigan Journal of International Law
increasingly concerned that workers in Western Europe should have a
voice in reconstruction as a potential bulwark against their support of
socialist and communist parties. U.S. Ambassador Averall Harriman,
speaking at an international trade union conference on the Marshall Plan
in 1948, made this point explicitly, stating that "all non-governmental
groups and organisations-business, agriculture, science or education-
can play a part in this work, but the international labour movement can
do the most."
4
'
Originally created in 1948 to provide advice to the OEEC in its im-
plementation of the Marshall Plan, TUAC has continued to provide
feedback from the international labor community through regular con-
sultations with OECD committees, the OECD secretariat, and Member
country delegates. 42 Based in Paris, TUAC is a free-standing organiza-
tion with affiliates from over 55 national trade unions in the 29 OECD
Member countries, representing approximately 70 million workers.
While formally affiliated with the OECD, TUAC is entirely financed by
its union affiliates who also determine policy and elect the TUAC offi-
43
cers.
In practice, TUAC exercises influence through regular meetings
with the OECD secretariat, drafting policy statements on major areas of
interest, and providing feedback to OECD work in progress. Often this
takes the form of TUAC presentations to committees and working
groups. In keeping with the policy of closed-door meetings, generally
the TUAC representative is allowed to participate in the meeting for
specific agenda points and then must leave the room. A number of
committees, however, have granted TUAC representatives status as ac-
tive observers. Another crucial avenue of TUAC's influence is through
regular communication, usually informally, with Ambassadors and dele-
gation staff. These discussions are often coordinated with contact by
TUAC affiliates with either high-ranking officials in capitals, or if need
be with Ministers directly. Approximately four hundred trade union rep-
resentatives participate annually in OECD meetings. TUAC itself has
41. TRADE UNION ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TUAC 1948-1998: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNIVER-
SARY SYMPOSIUM 52 (1998).
42. TUAC is also responsible for coordinating the trade union input to G7 economic
summits.
43. Most TUAC affiliates are members of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). TUAC works in close co-
operation with the ICFTU as well as the International Labour Organisation (ILO). TUAC also
cooperates with international trade union sectoral organizations concerning sectoral issues
such as education, public sector management, steel, and maritime transport. Trade Union
Advisory Committee, About TUAC, at http://www.tuac.org/about/about.htm (last modified
May 30, 2000).
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only a small staff, thus most of its committee representatives are outside
union officials brought in to address specific issues within their exper-
tise.
TUAC's coordination with its member union organizations ranges
from presentations at meetings and Congresses of affiliates as well as the
more formal TUAC Plenary Session, which meets twice a year and ulti-
mately determines TUAC's operations. All TUAC affiliates and the
representatives of international trade union organizations may partici-
pate. As with the committees that direct the OECD directorates' work
plans, the Plenary Session approves major TUAC policy statements, es-
tablishes the work program and priorities, determines the budget and
appoints TUAC Officers. The Plenary also appoints an Administrative
Committee to supervise more closely TUAC's activities." TUAC has
established internal working groups to provide counsel on economic
policy, global trade and investment, and education, training and labor
market policy.
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD
(BIAC) was created at the time of the OECD's birth in 1962.45 An inde-
pendent organization, BIAC is regarded by the OECD as its official link
with employers, business and industry interests. In terms of interactions
with the OECD, BIAC shares many of the same features as TUAC. It
holds regular consultations with the OECD secretariat, committees and
groups in order to provide an institutional counterbalance to the efforts
of TUAC. Its operations are overseen by its constituent members, gener-
ally national chambers of commerce and employers' organizations.
BIAC and TUAC interact formally in an initiative known as the La-
bour/Management Program. Partly financed by the OECD, the Program
provides a setting for meetings between trade union and management
44. The current Administrative Committee includes the German Confederation of Trade
Unions (DGB) (Germany), the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) (Canada), the Trade Union
Congress (TUC) (United Kingdom), the AFL-CIO (United States), the Force Ouvrire (FO)
and the Confdration Franqaise Ddmocratique du Travail (CFDT) (France), the Confrddra-
tion Italienne des Syndicats des Travailleurs (CISL) (Italy), the Japanese Trade Union
Confederation (RENGO) (Japan), the Federation of Austrian Trade Unions (OGB) (Austria),
the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) (Finland), and the Confrdrration
des Syndicats Chrdtiens de Belgique (CSC) (Belgium), as well as the President, Vice-
Presidents and General Secretary of TUAC. Trade Union Advisory Committee, How TUAC
Works, at http://www.tuac.org/how/how.htm (last modified May 30, 2000).
45. One member of the OECD staff interviewed for this study suggested that the formal
roles of TUAC and BIAC might have been an attempt to mimic the tripartite structure of the
ILO (government, employers, employees), founded over 30 years earlier. The creation of
BIAC fourteen years after that of TUAC, however, suggests that the architects of the OEEC
were primarily concerned with the political importance of trade unions' potential support for
communist parties and that the employers' need for a voice did not become apparent until
over a decade later.
Michigan Journal of International Law
experts on issues that are under examination at the OECD. In 1997, for
example, the Program held meetings on tax policy and tax competition,
equity and efficiency issues in the labor market, and the role of subsidies
in environmental policy.
4 6
II. THE OECD AND PROMOTION OF LABOR RIGHTS
While the OECD is not generally considered a significant IGO in the
context of labor rights (if even considered at all), in a small number of
cases it has exercised significant influence. Part II presents three exam-
ples in which the OECD has, in the context of its work on globalization,
directly and indirectly promoted the development of core labor rights.
Examination of these cases-the development of guidelines for multina-
tional enterprises, publication of research on the impacts of trade on
labor standards, and the accession of South Korea-provides insight into
both the potential and limits of the OECD's influence in promoting so-
cial issues.
A. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
Following revelations in the early 1970s of wide-scale unethical and
illegal activities by multinational companies, the U.N., ILO, OECD and
national governments focused on means to influence their behavior. As
previous examples made clear,48 much of the early activity centered on
the UN's attempt to draft a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpora-
tions. The UN's General Assembly adopted a consensus resolution on
measures against corrupt transnational practices, but failed to follow up
with a stronger legal instrument. One year later, in 1976, the OECD
Council of Ministers adopted a recommendation entitled the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
As its name suggests, the overriding purpose of the Declaration was
to promote transnational investment. To this end, the Declaration called
for Member countries to respect national treatment (according compara-
ble treatment to foreign-controlled enterprises as accorded to domestic
enterprises), minimize conflicting requirements on multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) by different governments, and make transparent
46. TUAC has annual consultations with the Ministerial Council and an annual meeting
with Ambassadors called the Liaison Committee.
47. The best known examples during this period were the involvement of ITT and other
U.S. companies in the 1973 Chilean coup that overthrew President Allende and the series of
bribes Lockheed paid to Japanese politicians for military contracts.
48. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
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incentives and disincentives to investment.49 In its introduction and
seven chapters, the Guidelines cover a wide breadth of issues governing
investments. The separate chapters range from such topics as informa-
tion disclosure, competition and financing to taxation, science and
technology but the requirements are generally vague and hortatory. The
chapter on competition, for example, encourages MNEs "to conform to
countries' rules and policies on competition by, for example, refraining
from forming cartels or restrictive agreements and from abusing domi-
nant market positions through anti-competitive acquisitions, predatory
behaviour and other practices."5°
One of its chapters set forth voluntary rules of conduct for MNEs.5'
These guidelines were necessary to promote investment, it was argued,
in order "to encourage the positive contributions which multinational
enterprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimise
and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give
rise."" The Guidelines, it was hoped, would ensure that the operations of
MNEs were compatible with the expectations of the host country by es-
tablishing a baseline of labor rights. They were supported by both
TUAC and BIAC-both sides of the bargaining table.
The chapter on employment and industrial relations was regarded
with great hope when it was included in the final Declaration. In setting
forth labor rights of union representation, collective bargaining, mean-
ingful engagement with management, and non-discrimination, the
Guidelines called on MNEs to:
" respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade
unions and other bona fide organisations and engage in con-
structive negotiations with them on employment conditions;
" provide assistance and information to employee representa-
tives;
" provide information for a true and fair view of the perform-
ance of the enterprise;
49. It is interesting to note that the term commonly used by U.N. agencies to describe
international business enterprises, "transnational corporations" (TNCs), is not used by the
OECD. When I used the acronym in an earlier draft, I was reminded by a member of the
OECD Secretariat, in what struck me as gentle snobbery, that "we don't use that phrase here.
We say MNE."
50. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises-Text, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/
mnetext.htm (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter Guidelines].
51. Paragraph 6 of the Introduction states that "observance of the Guidelines is voluntary
and not legally enforceable." See id.
52. See id. at Preface.
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" observe standards of employment and industrial relations not
less favorable than those observed by comparable employers
in the host country;
" utilize, train and prepare for upgrading their labor force;
• provide reasonable prior notice of changes in operations, in
particular on intended closures and collective layoffs;
" refrain from discriminatory practices in their employment
policies;
not exercise unfair influence over bona fide negotiations with
employee's representatives;
enable authorized representatives of their employees to con-
duct negotiations on collective bargaining or labor-
management relations with management representatives
authorised to take decisions on the matters at hand 3
Implementation of the Guidelines commences at the National Con-
tact Points within national governments. National Contact Points serve
as the initial stage of consideration for issues and conflicts arising under
the Guidelines. Any party, including BIAC, TUAC, and Member coun-
tries, who believes the Guidelines have been violated may request
consultations with the Contact Points. If the discussions at this level do
not resolve the issue between the parties, it can be passed to the OECD's
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
(CIME, pronounced "seemay"). CIME (located within the Directorate
for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs) is ultimately responsible for
adjudication and development of the Guidelines. CIME will respond to
disputes passed up by the National Contact Points by clarifying or inter-
preting specific language. This process of interpretation involves
discussion within CIME as well as consultations with BIAC and TUAC.
All CIME decisions require consensus among the Member countries.
Dispute resolution under the Guidelines should not be thought of as
a traditional judicial model, for CIME's decisions have no retrospective
53. While seemingly broad in scope, the Guidelines have been criticized by a number of
scholars as too narrowly focused.
The OECD Guidelines assume a mature collective bargaining relationship reflect-
ing institutional interests of large employer federations and trade union groupings
that serve on OECD advisory committees. They make no mention of discrimination
or violence against workers who try to organize, child labor, forced labor, mini-
mum wages, occupational health and safety, migrant labor, job security, social
insurance, the right to strike, or other labor standards.
Lance Compa, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and International Labor Rights: A
Failed Connection 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683, 688 (1998).
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applicability. Indeed, since the Guidelines were adopted as recommen-
dations, they cannot be treated as binding standards. CIME's judgments
do not "enforce the Guidelines" against either of the parties. Perhaps
surprisingly, given the formality of the process, CIME does not even
make a judgment on the behavior of the companies in question. Instead,
it uses the case to clarify the meaning of a provision in the Guidelines
and how it should be applied in future cases. In a legislative context, the
closest analogy to this practice would be if Congress continued creating
legislative history after its passage of a statute. The logic behind this
system is similar to that of the common law's clarification of doctrine in
specific applications. Unlike the common law analogue, however,
CIME's interpretations are never binding once established.
Following the Guidelines' adoption in 1976, TUAC actively sought
interpretation of the Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines
and brought a slew of cases resulting in over forty decisions by the end
of the 1980s. Their clear goal was to influence both MNE behavior and
national laws. Indeed, TUAC has consistently contended that Guidelines
are supplementary to national law and "may be contravened even in
cases where the multinational enterprise has acted in conformity with
national law and practice. 54 The Firestone and Badger cases provide
representative examples of the types of cases brought. The 1980s Fire-
stone case concerned the closing of a profitable subsidiary in
Switzerland. Brought with the assistance of TUAC, the Swiss Trade
Union Centre argued that the local management of Firestone had misled
the trade unions and workers committee, stating that the plant would not
be closed despite the fact, it later emerged, that local management had
been negotiating the closure for over a year. This would seem to violate
the Guideline's requirement, excerpted above, that employers "provide
reasonable prior notice of changes in operations, in particular on in-
tended closures and collective layoffs." In its review of the case, CIME
determined that the Guidelines require headquarters to provide local
management with accurate information so that local employees can be
informed or top management must inform employees directly. No action
was taken (or could be taken) against Firestone.
The Badger case addressed whether a corporate headquarters is fi-
nancially responsible for the debts of its subsidiaries. Badger was a
Belgian subsidiary of an American company. When Badger closed its
doors in the 1980s, it dismissed 250 employees and filed for bankruptcy.
Belgian law entitled employees to compensation in this instance. The
54. Fred Einbinder, Book Review, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232 (1985) (reviewing DUN-
CAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES (1983)).
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Belgian subsidiary of Badger, however, did not have sufficient compen-
satory funds and the American parent refused to pay, arguing limited
responsibility. The question at issue was what conditions must exist for a
mother company to pay the debts of its bankrupt subsidiary. The Belgian
appellant supported its argument with Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Intro-
duction to the OECD Guidelines." CIME's review concluded that
although the Guidelines do not imply an unqualified principle of parent-
subsidiary responsibility, there is a principle of qualified responsibility
by the parent that exceeds the scope of national law.
While the results of these cases and others led to CIME decisions
clearly promoting labor rights,56 these decisions largely fell on deaf ears
at the national level. Given that the Guidelines provided no binding ret-
rospective or prospective application, and carried no sanctions in the
case of violations, the lack of domestic response is unsurprising. Real-
izing the decisions were having little influence on government or MNE
behavior, TUAC become less involved and the 1990s saw only four la-
bor cases brought. In a recent example, France requested an advisory
opinion over the Hoover Corporation moving its plant to Scotland,
claiming that Scottish authorities had offered financial inducements that
violated the Guidelines. France also filed a complaint with Belgium
against Renault's decision and conduct in shutting down an auto plant in
Belgium.
55. Paragraph 7 stipulates that entities of MNEs located in other countries are subject to
the laws of those countries. To this end, the Belgian government argued that the Belgian af-
filiate is subject to the law of Belgium, which would require Badger Belgium to pay
compensation. Paragraph 8 of the Introduction states that the various entities should have the
understanding that they must provide the necessary assistance to one another to ensure obser-
vance of the Guidelines. Thus, the Belgian government argued that: 1) local subsidiaries must
pay; and 2) parent and local entities must cooperate and assist each other in complying with
the guidelines in accordance with the actual distribution of responsibilities. See Roger Blan-
pain, Transnational Regulation of the Labor Relations of Multinational Enterprises: 58 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 909, 917-18 (1982).
56. Another well known case, the Hertz case, addressed whether Guideline 8 forbids the
transfer of workers from a foreign branch with the intent to unfairly influence ongoing local
negotiations. In the midst of a labor dispute, Hertz Rental Car transferred workers from
branches in other countries to replace Danish workers on strike. Hertz workers argued that
this undermined a lawful strike in Denmark to avoid bona fide negotiations of a collective
agreement with the representative trade union. CIME concluded that while Paragraph 8 did
not specifically preclude Hertz's behavior, its actions did not conform to the "spirit" or intent
of the Employment and Industrial Relations Chapter. As a result, the Guidelines were
amended in 1979 to prohibit the transfer of employees in order to unfairly influence labor
negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a right to organize. For this and other case summaries,
see Christopher R. Coxson, The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Co-
ercive Trade Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 469 (1999). For the Hertz and Badger decisions,
see INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Case
Law Supp. vol. 6, at OECD-13, OECD-21 to -22. (Prof. Dr. R. Blanpain, ed. 1985)
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Since CIME decisions require consensus and, in any case, are not
binding one might well conclude that they have as little influence on
corporate behavior as they apparently have had on domestic govern-
ments. That certainly is the reason TUAC stopped bringing cases.
Criticizing the irrelevance of CIME's decisions, trade union leaders have
referred to the Guidelines as a "paper tiger" and a "fig leaf."57 Indeed, a
number of scholars have suggested that the Guidelines' weakness was
intentional from the outset-an effective and intentional strategy to pre-
empt the stricter and more comprehensive United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations under negotiation at the same
time. As Lena Ayoub has written, because the Guidelines
only effects OECD countries, most of which already have strong
trade union movements and relatively consistent enforcement of
labor laws, it has done little in the way of solving the human la-
bor rights violations conducted by MNCs. Furthermore, this
code is merely reflective of 'boutique rights' and fails to address
the human labor rights violations frequently associated with
MNCs based overseas. 59
57. See Blanpain, supra note 55, at 916. Blanpain is skeptical about the ultimate practical
effect of the Guidelines:
[T]he Guidelines do not exist at the grassroot level. They are still widely un-
known.... [T]he actual support by enterprises, such as indications in their annual
reports that they support the Guidelines, is meager.
What has happened in terms of the further protection of employee interests as a re-
sult of the Guidelines and the cases mentioned? Factually, the answer can only be
"very little." ... Emphasis continues to be placed on the practice of industrial rela-
tions at the national and local levels and, almost without exception, the disputes
that have arisen under the Guidelines have been settled under existing national laws
and practices....
Id. at 920, 928.
58. The Code of Conduct, for example, addressed human rights and environmental pro-
tection, while the Guidelines (until revisions in 1991 and 2000) were silent on these issues.
See Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their
Intermediaries, and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34,
at 69, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Interview with Daniel Bradlaw, Professor, Washington
College of Law, in Washington, D.C. (May 24, 2000). See also Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does
It-And Why the United States Shouldn't: The United States' International Obligation to
Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
395, 402 (1999).
59. Ayoub, supra note 58, at 421. TUAC has always contended that the Guidelines apply
to MNE activities outside of the OECD. They have been unable, however, to convince Na-
tional Contact Points of CIME to hear a complaint involving a non-Member country. The
most recent version of the Guidelines, discussed infra, has changed this and applies wherever
MNEs from adhering countries operate.
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Yet the OECD speaks approvingly of the Guidelines' impact, as do
some labor relations experts. Richard Rowan, a professor at the Wharton
Business School, contends that the Guidelines provide meaningful
mechanisms to influence OECD Member countries and their corpora-
tions through surveillance and peer pressure. The Guidelines, he claims,
have been used by the international union movement to support
broader union goals. Publicity pertaining to the cases has led to
union pressure for the establishment of binding guidelines and
legislation. This has been evident most recently in the pressure
placed by the European Trade Union Confederation on the
European Commission for the passage of the Vredeling pro-
posal.
In a later book, Rowan argued that the Guidelines could serve the
role of "enforced international regulation of multinationals" through ad-
verse publicity. And, in fact, there are several examples of this,
including the most recent case brought.6 '
60. Blanpain, supra note 55, at 928. The Vredeling proposal requires employers to pro-
vide information to and consult with local employees at least 40 days prior to decisions that
are liable to have a substantial effect on the interests of employees, including the rationale for
the decision as well as the legal, economic and social consequences to employees.
61. DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 7 (Multinational Industrial Relations Series,
No. II, 1983). Lance Compa argues that:
some unions have been able to use the OECD Guidelines to advance their agenda,
though more by public relations or inter-union solidarity measures than through
pressure brought from the OECD. The United Mine Workers turned to the OECD
following a 1988 labor dispute over layoff and recall protections at Enoxy Coal
Co., a West Virginia mine owned by ENI, the Italian state-run energy company. A
complex "exchange of views" was held among the union, the employers (both the
U.S. subsidiary and ENI), and government "contact points" who obtained the views
of their own ministries or departments. Pressure on the Italian government by un-
ions helped resolve the dispute to the UMWA's satisfaction.
In the 1980s, a U.S. union facing anti-labor conduct by the local management of a
U.S. subsidiary of the Swedish Electrolux corporation used the OECD contact
points system. Swedish unions pressured their government to persuade Swedish
parent company managers to convince U.S. executives to halt their objectionable
conduct. In 1990, the United Food and Commercial Workers made a similar move
to the OECD in a dispute with the Belgium-based Carrefour supermarket chain.
International pressure that included solidarity moves by Belgian unions brought
about a settlement in April 1991, by which the company recognized the union and
entered into bargaining.
Compa, supra note 53, at 691
The most recent case involved an intervention by TUAC in a dispute between Rio Tinto
Australia and an Australian union. While CIME had ruled that Rio Tinto Australia had not
breached the Guidelines, TUAC requested a clarification, charging that Australia's National
Contact Point had operated in a biased manner. TUAC's request for clarification was success-
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The Guidelines have been amended four times: in 1979, in 1984, in
1991, and in 2000. In 1991, a new chapter was added on the environ-
ment. The most recent revisions, approved on June 27, 2000, were the
result of lengthy negotiations with Member countries and consultations
with a wide range of NGOs. The new Guidelines explicitly refer to the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in the
Preamble. In Chapter IV, the most significant additions focus on human
rights. The Guidelines state that "enterprises should, within the frame-
work of applicable law, regulations and prevailing labour relations and
employment practices ... contribute to the effective abolition of child"
labor and "[c]ontribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or com-
pulsory labour., 62 Enterprises are also called upon, to the greatest extent
practicable, to employ local personnel and provide training to increase
skill levels. TUAC lobbying efforts to change the requirement of CIME
agreement to a supermajority or a "consensus minus one" (i.e., except
the country where the practice was challenged) were unsuccessful. Labor
advocates were, however, successful in expanding the jurisdiction of the
Guidelines. The Guidelines now apply to the global operations of MNEs
based in adhering countries. Thus, for example, a Venezuelan-based
subsidiary of an American MNE would be covered by the Guidelines.
The substance of the Guidelines was not the only change of impor-
tance in the recent review. As explained in the concluding section, as a
result of the MAI experience, 64 the revision process was much more in-
clusive than ever before. For the first time ever, CIME actively sought
input from both outside the OECD (public comments and the ILO) and
ful, allowing the union to re-submit the case. In part because of the negative publicity sur-
rounding the case, Rio Tinto subsequently cut a deal with the union. This dispute took place
during the review of the Guidelines, and TUAC's Senior Policy Advisor believes that "[t]his
... raised the ante as regards the Working Party debate around new implementation proce-
dures." Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
62. Guidelines, supra note 50, at Chapter IV.
63. While Venezuela would not have a National Contact Point in its government, the
Procedural Guidance annex to the Council Decision on the Guidelines provides advice and
guidance for the U.S. National Contact Point to follow in case of challenges in non adhering
countries. Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 3, 2000) (on file with author). The ac-
tual coverage of the Guidelines could be larger yet, since the General Policies chapter
mentions sub-contractors and suppliers of MNEs. See Guidelines, supra note 50, at Chapter
11(10).
64. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Issues Re-
vised Draft of its Guidelines for Multinationals for Further Public Comment, at
http://www.oecd.orglmedialrelease/nwOO-27a.htm (Mar. 15, 2000); see also discussion infra
Part III.A.5.
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inside (from the Environment Directorate, ELSA and the OECD Work-
ing Party on Bribery and Corruption).
B. The Labour Standards Study
Unlike most other OECD directorates, ELSA does not develop rec-
ommendations or decisions and never has. Rather, its focus has been on
careful analytic research and policy development, preferring to leave
political activity to the much larger tripartite ILO (i.e., representatives
from unions, employers' organizations, and government). The most re-
cent important example of this approach was the 1996 report Trade,
Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Worker's Rights
and Labour Standards (the Labour Standards Study) . In the early
1990s, ELSA began a joint project with the Trade Directorate and the
Directorate for Financial and Fiscal Affairs (DAFFE) to examine the
relationships between core labor standards and flows of trade and for-
eign direct investment. In particular, the research considered the impact
of core labor standards on economic development and assessed the use
of trade-related sanctions to promote core labor standards. The report
was written over an intensive two-year period of workshops and drafting
sessions.
The OECD's research brought about four significant developments.
First, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the findings of
the report in detail,66 the basic conclusions played a strong role inform-
ing international debate on the issue. In particular, the report addressed
head-on the widely held view that failure to respect core labor standards
enhances trade and foreign investment performance (i.e., the concern
from some developing countries that creating certain labor rights would
undermine their comparative advantage). The study found that the eco-
nomic effects of core labor standards are small, with no evidence that
low-standard countries enjoy better export performance than high-
standard countries. 67 Thus "concerns expressed by certain developing
65. ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, EMPLOY-
MENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1996) [hereinafter LABOUR STANDARDS STUDY]. The study first justifies its selection
of core labor standards, than reviews 91 countries to assess whether they have observed the
standards, examines the impact of core standards on trade flows, trade liberalization, devel-
opment, employment, investment, and ends by considering mechanisms to promote labor
standards.
66. For a detailed summary and critique of the findings, see Steve Charnovitz, Trade,
Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade
and Labor Standards Debate, I I TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 131 (1997).
67. The OECD identified four core rights: (1) Freedom of association and the right of
collective bargaining; (2) Prohibition of forced labor; (3) Prohibition of discrimination in
employment; and (4) Prohibition of exploitative forms of child labor.
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countries that core standards would negatively affect their economic per-
formance or their international competitive position are unfounded."68
Moreover, there was no evidence that labor rights worsened in countries
that liberalized trade or that the promotion of labor rights impeded liber-
alization. Indeed, the study suggested that respect for core standards and
economic development were mutually reinforcing. From TUAC's per-
spective, the report both confirmed the consensus support of OECD
Member countries for core labor rights and laid the groundwork for the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. It also
heightened the OECD's sensitivity to labor rights concerns and made it
easier for countries to demand recognition of labor rights as a condition
for South Korea's accession to the OECD.69
Second, the exercise greatly enhanced communication concerning
trade and labor rights both between governments and, perhaps surpris-
ingly, within governments. The exercise of writing a joint report by the
Trade Directorate, DAFFE and ELSA forced together officials from
each nation's trade and labor ministries into unified country delegations.
As a result, officials who most likely did not communicate with one an-
other in their own capitals were forced to forge common national
positions. Thus, the publication process required separate ministries
within national governments to consider seriously the linkages between
labor rights and trade, competitiveness, and foreign direct investment, as
well as how best to enforce core labor standards. And these were taken
seriously. It is worth noting, for example, that the country comments on
the study were nearly three times as long as the study itself.
Third, the exercise brought the issue of relative institutional spheres
of influence to the fore. There was a great deal of negotiation among
Member countries over the common statement introducing the report,
focusing on the respective roles of the WTO and ILO on labor issues. In
particular, a number of countries questioned whether labor issues should
be considered by the WTO at all since the ILO is the preeminent inter-
national labor institution. This argument is very similar to the trade and
environment debate and, of course, fails to consider the relative influ-
ence of the two institutions.70 The end result was noncommittal language
68. LABOUR STANDARDS STUDY, supra note 65, at 13.
69. See discussion infra Part II.C.
70. In the case of trade and the environment, free traders often argue that the WTO
agreements are an inappropriate vehicle to address environmental issues. Instead, they call for
consideration of these issues in the U.N. Environment Program or conferences of the parties
of multilateral environmental agreements. See generally HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, su-
pra note 5, at 1178-79 (discussing the complexity of the trade and environment debate). A
similar disagreement over linkages resurfaced in negotiations over the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment.
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stating that, "while some countries continue to call for a discussion of
the issue [of core labor standards] in the WTO and others are opposed,
this remains an issue for international consideration. The debate on this
issue and on the associated conceptual and practical difficulties will
continue.'
Fourth, and perhaps surprisingly, the Labour Standards Study pro-
vided an important impetus for developments within the ILO. While the
study was written by the ELSA secretariat, there was a great deal of con-
sultation with ILO staff, particularly in determination of core labor
rights.72 In consulting with the ILO in early drafts of the Labour Stan-
dards Study, the ELSA secretariat asked the ILO to prioritize its
conventions. Internally, ILO staff were reluctant to do so and unwilling
to determine which labor protections and rights were more important
than others. Over time, however, by identifying the core labor standards
for the OECD secretariat to consider, the ILO clearly paved the way for
the later ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
in 1998 and Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor in 1999.
73
Would the results have been the same if the Labour Standards Study
had been written by the ILO or the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) instead of the OECD? Given the political
composition of the institutions, the answer is almost certainly no.
Reaching agreement on the research findings among the 29 OECD
Member countries was hard enough. Had the exercise taken place at the
ILO, reaching agreement among the labor, employer and government
officials from both developed and developing countries would have been
harder still. In this regard, the OECD has a comparative advantage in
71. LABOUR STANDARDS STUDY, supra note 65, at 17.
72. While the core rights, listed supra note 67, are undoubtedly important, they leave a
great deal out, failing to address the right to strike, workplace health and safety, migrant
worker protection, minimum wages that provide decent living standards, job security, social
insurance, adjustment assistance for workers displaced by trade, and other "vital workers'
concerns." Compa, supra note 53, at 688. These rights and standards "are affected perhaps
even more than 'core' concerns by trade and investment pressures on many governments to
deregulate their domestic labor markets." Id.
73. International Labour Organization, International Labour Conf., 86th Sess., Declara-
tion on Standards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/index.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2000). Prior
to these agreements, the main ILO instrument on the issue of child labor had been Convention
138 on minimum employment age. Because it had failed to distinguish child labor in general
from its worst forms, however, Convention 138 had attracted very few ratifying parties.
Members of the ELSA secretariat who had presented the Labour Standards Study at
the ILO in 1996 (to the Working Party on the Social Dimensions on the Liberalisation of
International Trade) clearly believed it had contributed to move the debate away from sanc-
tion-based mechanisms toward promotion of core labor standards.
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terms of efficiency both because its membership is restricted to generally
like-minded economic partners and, perhaps more important, since it
need not gain the approval of BIAC or TUAC.
One might argue, though, that ILO research, because of the need for
collaboration with the social partners, produces more evenhanded results
that fairly reflect the perspectives of governments, labor and manage-
ment. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that ELSA has no intention of
developing regulations or standards. The structure of the ILO is much
more amenable to these political activities. Yet it is equally, if not more
likely, that the collaboration would result in vague and ineffectual com-
promise at the lowest common denominator. UNCTAD could argue, too,
that its research reflects more fairly the concerns of developing countries
than OECD publications. As Steve Charnovitz has noted, for example,
topics of particular importance to developing countries have received
scant attention.
Many important issues regarding investment are omitted. The
OECD Secretariat does not study the extent to which corpora-
tions use domestic labor standards in operating foreign plants.
Nor does the Secretariat analyze whether governments should
apply core labor standards being enforced domestically to their
own corporations operating in other countries.... Despite the
fact that labor standards may be an important factor in economic
development, the OECD Study barely scratches the surface on
this issue.
74
This may well be the case, but must be. considered, in light of the fact
that neither the ILO nor UNCTAD possess the combined research per-
sonnel and funding of the OECD. Moreover, given the rules of
consensus for derestriction and the OECD's access to government data,
the Labour Standards Study represents a statement of considerable
authority.75
74. Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 138-47. While the quote above accurately describes the
final text, it fails to acknowledge the often bitter arguments between governments, TUAC,
and BIAC over whether to address labor standard abuses in foreign plants (i.e., in subsidiaries
of MNEs based in OECD countries). Apparently several governments supported TUAC's
demands to examine this issue but faced strong opposition threatening to block the entire
study. Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 1, 2000) (on file with author).
75. It should be noted, however, that the study was not without critics:
The study is silent with respect to: (1) how strong the correlation is between ratifi-
cation of, and compliance with, ILO conventions; (2) what the labor records reveal
of the countries most vociferously opposing a WTO role in reviewing labor stan-
dards; and (3) whether there is correlation between non-compliance with
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And it is authoritativein a.number of ways. It is no news for the ILO
to publish a report concluding that the benefits of improved labor rights
are large while the costs are small. Indeed most observers expect the ILO
to produce research that promotes labor rights. That is one of the main
reasons for the organization's existence. The same conclusion coming
from the OECD, however, is another matter entirely. One can justify
core labor standards through either normative or efficiency arguments.
The ILO provides an effective international forum to publicize the ethi-
cal bases for core labor rights. The OECD, in contrast, rarely ventures
into explicit normative pronouncements. This is not surprising, given its
expertise in economic analysis] 6 As a result, the OECD carries consider-
able authority when declaring economic findings. This is, after all, the
same organization to whom countries and markets listen attentively
when forecasting economic growth. Ironically, the OECD's Labour
Standards Study proved influential precisely because it was a topic out-
side the OECD's traditional areas of focus, yet the issues were framed in
terms of economic analysis-translating rights into economic impacts-
as questions particularly within the OECD's sphere of unchallenged ex-
pertise."
C. Accession of South Korea
From 1990 through 1995, in response to the fall of the Iron Curtain
and the rise of NAFTA, the OECD's membership grew 20% through
multilateral conventions on labor standards and non-compliance with other multi-
lateral conventions (e.g., environmental standards)....
Taken as a whole, the OECD Study is disappointing. In some instances, the Secre-
tariat exaggerates faint relationships. Its analysis is weak, and many important
issues are omitted or inadequately addressed. The most serious problem, however,
is that the OECD Study provides little added-value to the ongoing international de-
bate. This is uncharacteristic of the OECD, which traditionally has produced
cutting edge analysis of public policy. Perhaps political pressures within the OECD
impeded the normal standard of quality typically shown in OECD work.
Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 138, 152. Charnovitz's characterization seems overly harsh
since, as described supra, the Labour Standards Study significantly influenced the acceptance
of a "core" set of labor rights by governments in the ILO.
76. This is not to suggest that economic analysis is somehow pure and free from norma-
tive assumptions (e.g., that efficiency is a desirable and appropriate social goal). Such
normative underpinnings, however, remain largely unspoken.
77. As a member of the ELSA secretariat commented, "One remarkable illustration of
the influential role of the 1996 study on trade and labour standards is the very large number of
people and institutions that advocate the paternity of the conclusions emerging from the
study-in sharp contrast with the difficult period before its completion, when the project
looked like an orphan."
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adding four new countries." Labor rights did not have a bearing on these
accession negotiations, and never had for other countries, but they
played a central part in the accession of South Korea. During the 1980s
and early 1990s, South Korea had been the subject of a series of damn-
ing reports on labor practices. The international trade union movement,
including TUAC and the International Confederation of Free Trade Un-
ions (ICFTU), had long been concerned over Korean labor rights,
pushing the issue vigorously at the ILO. When Korea announced its de-
sire to join the OECD, labor groups seized the opportunity to raise the
issue where they could exercise real leverage, using accession to the
OECD as a carrot and, conversely, denial of OECD membership as a
stick. In conjunction with their national governments, these trade union
bodies lobbied the Member countries to press Korea on core labor rights;
countries such as the United States, the Nordic countries, and Austria
took up the cause actively.
In response to concerns raised over its employment practices, the
South Korean government promised to move towards internationally-
accepted labor standards in exchange for OECD membership. In October
1996, South Korea's foreign minister sent a letter to the OECD promis-
ing his country would change its labor laws to reflect "internationally
accepted standards." In approving Korea's accession, the OECD Council
welcomed Korea's commitment "to reform existing laws on industrial
relations in line with internationally accepted standards, including those
concerning basic rights such as freedom of association and collective
bargaining."'79
Interestingly, the legal basis for requiring core labor rights as a
precondition for OECD membership is unclear. While the OECD's
Internet website states that "the OECD brings together 29 countries
sharing the principles of the market economy, pluralist democracy, and
respect for human rights,"80 the OECD Convention creating the
organization is silent regarding democracy and human rights. Articles 1
and 2 require only that members promote policies designed to achieve
the highest sustainable economic growth and employment, contribute to
the expansion of world trade on a multilateral and non-discriminatory
basis, ensure economic growth and external and internal stability, reduce
78. These were Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Mexico.
79. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Pushing Ahead with
Reform in Korea-Labour Market and Social Safety-Net Policies, Table of Contents, Intro-
duction, Summary, and Policy Conclusions, at http://www.oecd.org/els/pdfs/Labour/docs/
Korea.pdf [hereinafter Korea].
80. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Online: Member-
ship, at http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htm (last modified Sept. 29,
2000).
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obstacles to trade in goods and services, keep each other informed with
the information necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks, and
consult together, carry out studies, and cooperate closely.
At a certain level, though, the lack of a firm legal basis requiring re-
spect for core labor rights is irrelevant. Since a consensus vote by the
Council of Ministers is required, the final decision for OECD accession
is explicitly political." Thus if a group of countries demands adherence
to certain requirements for accession, that becomes a mandatory re-
quirement in practice if not on paper. Thus does custom become
crystallized. In the case of Korea, Member countries decided that this
accession required meeting certain internationally-agreed labor stan-
dards.8 2 These standards, it should be noted, were never spelt out in
detail. However, they have tended to coalesce informally around Korea
ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98.83
The problem with such a practice is laid bare when a party violates
this understanding. Within months upon acceding to OECD member-
ship, the Korean government introduced new laws that weakened labor
rights, making it easier for employers to fire workers while keeping tight
controls on the political rights of labor unions. Not surprisingly, this
81. Article 16 of the Convention establishing the OECD requires unanimity. OECD
Convention, supra note 14, at Art. 16.
82. It is interesting to note that a double standard may be at play here. The U.S. Department
of Labor's National Administrative Office (established under the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, the labor side agreement) has determined that Mexico does not grant workers
the right of free association. However, Mexico's accession, championed by the United States,
was not linked to provision of labor rights. See U.S. NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF NAO SUBMISSION No. 940003 (1995), available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/nao/
pubrep940003.htm (last modified Jul. 31, 2000); Interview with Jerome Levinson, Professor of
Law, Washington College of Law, in Washington D.C. (May 29, 2000) (on file with author).
Part of this double standard is likely due to timing. Mexico was the first in the new wave
of OECD Members since the early 1980s. As such, there was no structural procedure in place
to assess a candidate's eligibility to join. While there had been informal discussions between
Ambassadors and senior OECD officials about Mexico joining, there had been no formal
examination or preparatory work in any of the OECD Committees (such as the now standard
process of an examination by CIME of the liberalization of capital account issues). Appar-
ently, the U.S. Treasury Secretary's announcement of the Ministerial of Mexico's ability to
join had not been cleared with (or agreed to by) other governments. The OECD Secretary
General and other governments concerned about the informality of Mexico's admission then
set in place Committee vetting procedures for future accessions.
83. Convention 87 is the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention, July 9, 1948 reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991 435 (Int'l Lab. Org. ed., 1992); Convention 98 is the Right to
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, July 1, 1949, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991 524 (Int'l Lab. Org. ed., 1992).
84. John Burton & Peter Montagnon, Labour Law Pledge Backfires on Kim: Seoul Could
Face the OECD's Unprecedented Censure, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 21, 1997, at 6.
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was viewed by OECD members as a violation,.of the October under-
standing and many of the Member countries demanded formal action
against the newest Member country.85 Beyond the perceived need to
demonstrate the organization's disapproval of South Korea's actions,
there was an even greater worry that this episode would serve as a trou-
bling precedent. There was real concern that the example of South Korea
joining a global economic organization and then defying its accession
commitments could affect China's application to join the WTO.
As a result, the OECD Council for the first time ever put in place a
Special Monitoring Process, directing the Secretariat to monitor labor
developments in a Member country. While formally this was not a mo-
tion of censure, it effectively operated as such. The Council asked ELSA
to "monitor closely the progress made on labour law reforms in light of
that commitment [i.e., Korea's commitment that its labor laws would
reflect internationally accepted standards]."86 ELSA's discussions with
Korea have focused on the country's commitments to safeguard freedom
of association and the right to collective bargaining." ELSA published
its review of labor rights in Korea this past June.88
The influence of the OECD's monitoring process has been mixed.
On the positive side, despite the absence of concrete sanctions, the fo-
cused attention of the OECD has clearly been of concern to the Korean
government and its labor laws have started to improve. 9 As a TUAC
official observed, "[i]t could be legitimately argued that outside of do-
mestic pressure, it has been OECD membership more than anything else,
including Korea's membership of the ILO that has led to the legalisation
of the teachers union, which paved the way for the legalisation of the
KCTU [i.e., the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions]." 90
85. Indeed, ELSA was asked by the Council to verify whether Korea's actions had vio-
lated its commitments to labor rights at the time of its accession.
86. See Korea, supra note 79, at 13.
87. ELSA focused on "a number of areas where Korean law and practice in industrial
relations was believed to be in conflict with internationally accepted standards." Korea, supra
note 79, at 13. These areas include trade union pluralism, third-party intervention in collective
bargaining, the right of public servants and teachers to organize, the right to strike in the pub-
lic sector, trade union membership "of dismissed or unemployed workers," and "the payment
by companies of their trade union officials." Id. at 13-14. There were also concerns about
"the arrest and imprisonment of trade unionists for activities that would be regarded as pursuit
of legitimate trade union goals in member countries." Id. at 14.
88. See Korea, supra note 79, at 5.
89. There is "no doubt" that, since the beginning of the monitoring process, "the legisla-
tive reforms have shifted Korean labour laws significantly in the desired direction." Korea,
supra note 79, at 14.
90. Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 1, 2000) (on file with author).
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In light of its progress, Korea launched a major diplomatic offensive
in the spring of 2000 to suspend the Monitoring Process, with the sup-
port of Japan and other Member countries. Through a mix of unilateral
opposition by some governments, supplemented by TUAC's lobbying
efforts with affiliates in capitals to swing their governments behind this
opposition, the motion before the Council to suspend the Monitoring
Process was defeated. In fact, the Council voted to continue ELSA's
monitoring activities. Shortly after this vote, in June and July, Korean
police allegedly attacked peacefully protesting union workers, arresting
the president of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, Dan Byung-
ho.9 1
Finally, it is interesting to note that Korea has not been required to
ratify the two ILO conventions that clearly embody core labor rights
(Conventions 87 and 98). While Korea has made substantial progress in
a number of areas, the ILO would likely not consider its legislation and
practice sufficiently "ripe" or advanced to sign them. Moreover, adher-
ence to these Conventions was never expressly requested by other
OECD Member countries (indeed, five Member countries, including the
United States, have not signed one or both of these Conventions, either).
In sum, then, the Council would likely accept a situation, similar to the
current U.S. situation, in which Korea complied with the important re-
quirements of the conventions without explicitly ratifying them.
III. THE OECD AND GLOBALIZATION
The OECD's most recent involvement with labor rights revolved
around negotiations over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
This Part presents a detailed case study of this episode because, beyond
being a fascinating story, the history of the agreement provides impor-
tant substantive and institutional insights. Substantively, the negotiations
represent the most recent attempt to link labor rights with an agreement
increasing economic liberalization. Institutionally, as a result of its
bruising interactions with governments and civil society, the OECD's
perception of itself and the public's perception of the OECD have dra-
matically changed.
91. Kim Min-hee, Police Clash with Unionists as Raid Ends 21-Day Lotte Hotel Walk-
out, KOREA HERALD, June 30, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Korea Herald File.
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A. A Case Study of the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI)
In the early 1990s, the OECD's Committee on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) commenced a research
project known as the Wider Investment Instrument Project. The project
reflected the concern among Member countries that existing multilateral
instruments governing foreign direct investment (FDI) had become in-
adequate in the face of unprecedented increases in investment. Flows of
foreign capital to developing countries, for example, had increased ten-
fold from 1982 to 1993 and almost twenty-fold by 1996, with a 40%
increase in FDI inflows from 1994 to 1995 alone.92 Total FDI now ex-
ceeds the value of goods in trade by more than five-fold yet, remarkably,
no comprehensive agreement governing FDI exists at the international
level.93
Absent a GATT or other treaty, the international legal framework
governing FDI has developed incrementally through a broad network of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which both establish and clarify the
rights of foreign investors. Mirroring the growth of FDI, the number of
BITs has dramatically increased as well. From 1989 to 1995, more BITs
were negotiated than during the previous three decades.94 By 1995, over
900 BITs had been signed between more than 150 nations.9 Through its
Wider Investment Instrument Project, the OECD Member countries
sought to bring order to this proliferation of FDI and BITs, perhaps
through a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) that would con-
solidate and harmonize the many BITs. This seemingly straightforward
and necessary exercise, however, became engulfed in a political and
public relations firestorm just a few years later, due in large part to its
treatment of labor rights. Despite the OECD's role in administering the
OECD Guidelines, the publication of the Labour Standards Study, and
the requirements accompanying South Korea's accession, the organiza-
tion was hardly a major focus of labor activists. How could it come to
pass that the low-profile, largely ignored OECD would soon become
92. Eric Burt, Note, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on For-
eign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1015, 1019 (1997).
93. Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of
the Draft MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 731, 744 (1998);
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 29
MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 382 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism]. See also
Burt, supra note 92, at 1016.
94. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1996)
(book review) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment].
95. Id.
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subject to condemnation by critics across the globe as the furtive archi-
tect of a new world order?
1. A Brief History of Investment Treaties
To answer, it is first necessary to place the OECD's efforts within
the larger historical context of legal restraints on investment. The initial
rise of large-scale FDI was an outgrowth of the large capital surpluses
generated by the nineteenth century industrial revolution.96 For the next
century, foreign investors faced two basic risks-repudiation of debts
and expropriation of property-and conflicting doctrines were cited as
controlling. The Calvo Doctrine, developed by nineteenth-century Ar-
gentine Carlos Calvo, maintained that foreign investment was due
treatment no more favorable than that given to local investment. In prac-
tice, this meant that all investments, foreign and domestic alike, were
subject to and subordinate to national economic policies, perhaps in-
cluding nationalization of industries and clearing of debts. The Calvo
Doctrine clashed directly with the policies of major European powers
and the United States, who freely and frequently used their armies to
enforce collection of private debts. Thus Teddy Roosevelt built on the
Monroe Doctrine, announcing that the United States reserved the exclu-
sive right to collect private debts in the Americas, by force if necessary.
While disputes over the appropriate treatment of FDI had arisen
following the nationalization of property by the Soviet Union after the
Bolshevik revolution of 1917, 97 conflict over investment protections
openly flared in 1938 when Mexico nationalized oil wells and farms
owned by U.S. companies. In a famous cable (later known as the Hull
Formula), Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation for the expropriated property. In response,
Mexico replied that the foreign investors were due no more compensa-
tion than that due to local investors; the principle of national treatment
demanded that the law should apply evenhandedly.
A League of Nations draft convention on investment had been pro-
posed as early as the 1920s but failed to gain sufficient support for
adoption from both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.
Following World War II, FDI protections were one of the key economic
issues addressed in the Bretton Woods negotiations. While the GATT
focused on trade, the more expansive Havana Charter was drafted to ad-
dress both trade and investment concerns. The proposed International
96. See generally Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 93, at 375-85.
97. Ian Brownlie states that from 1840 to 1940, some 60 claims commissions were cre-
ated to resolve disputes concerning harm to foreign interests. Vandevelde, Sustainable
Liberalism, supra note 93, at 379 n.43.
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Trade Organization would have had the authority "to facilitate an equi-
table distribution of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment"
and to "assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills,
capital, arts and technology brought from one Member country to an-
other."98 The ITO's investment provisions were general, requiring only
that States "give due regard to the desirability of avoiding discrimination
as between foreign investments."99 Even these mild requirements, how-
ever, proved controversial, drawing criticism from developing countries
that regarded them as too biased toward protection of multinationals and
from developed countries that regarded them as too restrictive. With the
failure of the Senate to ratify the Havana Charter, international regula-
tions for FDI never entered into force.
While the U.N. Charter outlawed the use of force to protect foreign
property, thus vitiating the Monroe Doctrine's threat of martial invest-
ment protections, there still existed no strong international agreement
addressing FDI. Despite (or perhaps because of) the broad scale nation-
alization of companies by former colonies in the 1950s and 1960s,
attempts in the GATT over that period to negotiate comprehensive FDI
rules also failed.'0 At the time these were not regarded as critically im-
portant losses since FDI was much less significant than trade to the
vitality of the international economy.
During this period, the OECD played a significant role in regulating
FDI. Since its earliest days, the OECD has promoted liberal economic
98. 1 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS at 4,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30.Vol.1, U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.9 (1996). It also provided a
chapter addressing restrictive business practices, with international complaints and investiga-
tion procedure, as well as a labor clause. See id.; Picciotto, supra note 93, at 733.
99. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & EMP., CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION, FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS at 9, U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/4, Sales No.
1948.II.D.4 (1948). See also Burt, supra note 92, at 1029.
100. A 1958 GATT resolution recognized that the activities of multinationals "may
hamper the expansion of world trade and economic development in individual countries and
thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions and of removal of quantitative restrictions or
otherwise interfere with the objectives of the General Agreement." Restrictive Business Prac-
tices: Appointment of Group Experts, Nov. 5, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 29 (1959).
An Experts Group was created to examine the regulation of multinationals' practices and
determined that a comprehensive agreement was not feasible. See Restrictive Business Prac-
tices: Arrangements for Consultations, June 2, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 170-71
(1961). As a result, the GATT Contracting Parties agreed to allow governments to negotiate
over harmful multinational activities. See General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, The Activi-
ties of GATT 1960-61, at 29-30 (1961). See also Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of
the Council on the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967,
OECD Publication No. 23081 (Nov. 1967), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968); Washington
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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policies to increase the cross-border flow. of goods, services, and capital
investment. In 1951, the predecessor to the OECD, the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation, adopted a Code of Liberalization of
Current Invisible Transactions; in 1961, the OECD adopted the Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements."01 The Codes were legally binding
and required Member countries to notify:
the OECD of existing restrictions on foreign direct investment,
capital movements and cross-border trade in services, not to in-
troduce additional restrictions (except under specific
conditions), to apply any measures without discrimination
among OECD countries, and to submit themselves to a peer-
review process that aims progressively to remove remaining re-
strictions over time.
0 2
Over time, the Codes' membership and breadth of coverage have in-
creased, reflecting the more general trend among nations of liberalizing
their investment rules.03 In 1989, for example, the Codes were amended
to include banking, investment and financial services. Their obligations
now "cover virtually all international capital flows, short term and long
term, as well as the cross-border provision of financial services."'4 The
1976 Declaration of International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises (including the Guidelines on labor rights discussed in the previous
section) also touched on investments, requiring Member countries to
accord to foreign enterprises within their borders terms no less favorable
than those accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises. 5 The
101. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Introduction to the
OECD Codes of Liberalisation, at http://www.oecd.org//daf/investmentllegal-instrumentsl
codes.htm (last modified Jan. 20, 2000); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (June
27, 2000), http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/guidelines/declaratl.htm (last modified June
30, 2000).
102. Robert Ley & Pierre Poret, The New OECD Members and Liberalisation, OECD
OBSERVER, Apr.-May 1997, at 38.
103. In 1961, the liberalization obligations "were essentially limited to the free disposal
of non-resident-owned blocked funds and free transfers in connection with the making and
liquidation of funds and free transfers in connection with the making and liquidation of in-
ward direct investments." See HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 63 (quoting Pierre Poret,
CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALISATION: OECD APPROACH AND RULES 4-5 (1998)). The Code
was subsequently revised in 1964, to include "basic underlying transactions such as direct
investment [and] certain long-term securities" and in 1984 "to cover the fight of establishment
of direct investors"; in 1989, the Code was amended "to cover all other capital movements,
such as money-market transactions, operations in forward markets, swaps, options, and other
derivative instruments." Id.
104. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 7.
105. However, this provision did not cover all investors and lacked meaningful en-
forcement procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms.
[Vol. 21:769
Summer 2000] Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions
Codes also permitted governments to enter reservations in order to re-
strict certain types of capital flows. Despite these weak provisions and
nonexistent enforcement powers, by the early 1990s the OECD's Decla-
ration of International Investment and Codes arguably provided more
coverage of FDI matters than the agreements created by any other IGO.
In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. These agreements,
however, were hardly the stuff of major controversy and few politicians,
much less NGOs, even knew they existed. Why, then, was there such an
explosive, though delayed, reaction to the MAI?
Multinational enterprises engage in FDI for a host of reasons that
lower their costs of doing business-avoiding tariffs, reducing transport
costs, securing access to natural resources, taking advantage of cheap
labor, etc. The attractive benefits offered by FDI to host developing
countries are also undeniable. For the host country, FDI can provide
needed capital, spur technology transfer, create jobs, and increase do-
mestic competition and foreign exchange. Since the late 1970s,
governments both within and outside the OECD have reversed their tra-
ditional opposition to liberalization of FDI, increasingly warming to the
role of inward direct investment and creating legal structures to attract
further investment.' °6 This has primarily occurred through the gradual
removal of legal barriers and restrictions to capital movements, opening
up previously restricted sectors to investors, eliminating performance
requirements, offering attractive investment incentives, and implement-
ing better protections for foreign investors.0 7 Often, these policies have
been expressed through BITs.
Most BITs provide the same basic protections-national treatment,
most favored nation (MFN) treatment, prohibition of exchange controls,
prohibition of uncompensated expropriation, and resolution of disputes
by binding arbitration.08 Importantly, BITs have not addressed linkages
with other fields.' °9 If the only concerns raised by FDI were expropria-
tion of property and repayment of debts, this lack of linkages would
make good sense. In practice, however, FDI can have a direct relation to
labor, environmental and other social welfare concerns because the goals
of MNEs and host countries may conflict. Notwithstanding their desires
106. There are a variety of explanations for why this change in attitude and practice took
place at that period rather than earlier. Kenneth Vandevelde examines a number of contribut-
ing factors. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 97, at 386-90.
107. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 7, 24-25 ("From the early-to-mid 1980s, a growing
number of countries, chiefly in Latin America and East Asia, took steps to relax or abolish
restrictions on trade and capital flows."). The two main areas of change have been exchange
controls and restrictions on inward FDI.
108. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 93, at 374
109. In interviews, TUAC claimed that none of the 1600 BITs address labor issues.
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to accommodate FDI, host countries may also seek to promote important
local policy objectives. For example, in efforts to increase employment,
countries may employ a range of operational restrictions (also known as
performance requirements), such as mandating the hiring of local work-
ers and limiting the ability of the company to employ foreign workers.
For this reason, as well as concerns over sovereignty, developing coun-
tries have preferred negotiating BITs and, with few exceptions, have
uniformly opposed strong multilateral rules liberalizing FDI under the
auspices of the GAIT or WTO."0
2. Movement Toward Negotiating an MAI at the OECD
During the Uruguay Round, a number of countries had sought to
harmonize the patchwork of BITs through an MAI. The United States
and others proposed a comprehensive investment agreement but faced
concerted opposition from developing countries. The ultimate compro-
mise, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS),
addressed investment restrictions that directly affect trade flows in
goods."' While it represented the first global agreement specifically di-
rected at FDI since 1947, the TRIMS Agreement focuses narrowly on
measures that distort trade, leaving the most important investment meas-
ures outside the agreement and, therefore, outside the scope of the WTO
dispute settlement process."' Described by one commentator as "a useful
if somewhat meagre result of five years of tough negotiation," the
TRIMS Agreement was not viewed at the time as a significant achieve-
ment, in part because it largely restated GATT law." 3 Several other
Uruguay Round agreements, most notably the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
110. Burt, supra note 92, at 1016-17 (identifying the view of developing countries that
"restrictive investment policy [is] a sovereign right and an element of national economic pol-
icy," as well as their concerns about "abuse by multinational enterprises" and "loss of
sovereign control," as reasons for their resistance to a restrictive investment policy).
11l. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1179-80 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIMS Agreement].
112. There are several investment measures not covered by the TRIMS Agreement, in-
cluding local equity requirements, technology transfer and licensing requirements, local
manufacturing requirements, personnel entry restrictions, local employment requirements,
remittance restrictions, and export performance requirements. Burt, supra note 92, at 1037-
38. In particular, the lack of a prohibition on export performance "is a substantial failure of
the agreement because export subsidies, which are closely related, are prohibited under the
international trading system." Id. The foci of the TRIMS Agreement are primarily local con-
tent regulations and trade-balancing conditions. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 15.
113. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 16 (quoting JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 309 (1995)).
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of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), created disciplines
liberalizing FDI, but these only represented first steps, failing to address
the bulk of FDI.
4
Developing country opposition to a comprehensive investment
agreement at the WTO has not weakened since the close of the Uruguay
Round. In fact, when development of investment rules was again pro-
posed at the WTO in 1996, opposition by developing countries blocked
negotiations, leading to the weak compromise of new working groups on
trade and investment and trade and competition policy to examine these
areas more deeply.' 5
Against this backdrop of failure, after completing over 70 prepara-
tory studies, CIME and the Committee on Capital Movements and
Invisible Transactions (CMIT) reported to the OECD Council in 1995
that "the foundations have now been laid for the successful negotiation
of ... [an MAI] building on OECD's existing instruments and exper-
tise."' 6 Based on this advice, the Council decided to move from research
of BITs to negotiation of the MAI. The stated goal was to complete the
treaty by May 1997. A high-level negotiating group was established out-
side the directorate structure, serviced by DAFFE (primarily from
CIME) secretariat staff. They were given a mandate to create an agree-
ment that would
provide a broad multinational framework for international in-
vestment with high standard for the liberalisation of investment
regimes and investment protection and with effective dispute
settlement procedures [and] be a free-standing international
114. The TRIPS Agreement addresses the transfer of technology through FDI, a com-
mon activity of multinationals in host countries). See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
115. Burt, supra note 92, at 1049 n.282 (identifying Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Tanzania, Thailand, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe
as the thirteen developing countries that expressed opposition to comprehensive investment
talks in the WTO at a meeting of developing countries in New Delhi, India in September 1996
and pointing out that Pakistan and Sri Lanka also expressed their support for this position).
See also 13 Developing Nations Oppose Investment Pact, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 1, 1996, at 15;
Frances Williams, WTO Push for Investment Rules Pact: Developing Countries Divided De-
spite Ruggiero's Assertion of a "Compelling Case," FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 1996, at 4;
Frances Williams, US May Block WTO Draft, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 4, 1996, at 6. Pro-
posals for investment talks were raised again at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore at
the end of 1996, and resisted by a group of developing countries including, in particular, In-
dia, Egypt, Malaysia and Uganda. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 16.
116. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 1.
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treaty open to all OECD Members and the European Communi-
ties, and to accession by non-OECD Member countries. "'
Drafting Groups and Preparatory Groups were established to address
specific issues and flesh out areas of agreement before going to the main
Negotiating Group in Plenary session. All the Member countries partici-
pated and, within two years, eight non-Member countries joined as
observers.
From the outset, the Secretariat regarded the MAI negotiations as a
technical harmonization exercise. Given the great deal of commonality
among the many investment treaties, it was expected that the OECD sec-
retariat would review the range of BIT texts, identify common features,
and create a unifying draft that would form the basis of a general agree-
ment. The MAI, it was hoped, would be the first comprehensive
international investment treaty and would create uniform rules for FDI
protection, liberalization, and dispute settlement. By creating a more
level playing field than the bumpy terrain of BITs, the MAI would
greatly reduce distortions to investment flows and therefore speed the
growth of FDI, significantly promoting the liberalization of investment
measures and performance requirements beyond the results of the Uru-
guay Round agreements. If adopted, the MAI would supersede the
OECD Codes and the Declaration, replacing them with an agreement
with substance and teeth.
It is important to remember that the OECD was chosen as the nego-
tiating forum for the MAI by the Member countries, not by the OECD
staff itself. When controversy erupted over the negotiations in 1997,
many criticized the selection of the OECD as a negotiating forum as a
dubious choice, at best. In many respects, though, this was an eminently
reasonable decision, for the OECD seemingly offered three comparative
institutional advantages over rival negotiating fora.
First, the goal of the negotiations was consistent with the OECD's
founding goal. From the earliest days of the OEEC and the successor
OECD, the organization had served as a forum for liberalizing trade and
capital flows, most notably through the Codes of Liberalization and the
National Treatment Instruments in the Declaration. Second, as discussed
in the introduction to this section, the OECD had much greater in-house
expertise (in particular the DAFFE Secretariat in CIME and CMIT) on
international investment issues than the other relevant IGOs, particularly
the trade-focused WTO and UNCTAD. This was the same organization,
117. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 2.
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after all, that had drafted the Investment Codes in the first place."' It is
clear from interviews with OECD staff that, while the OECD secretariat
and Member countries generally expected that this exercise would result
in upward harmonization, they emphatically did not view the project as a
politically contentious issue. The Secretariat involved considered the
undertaking a strictly analytical project that made use of the OECD's
substantial institutional knowledge.
In retrospect, given the failure to resolve these issues at the WTO,
this blind eye to controversy seems surprising. Yet neither the Member
countries nor the secretariat expected that the project would involve la-
bor or environmental concerns, much less that it would become an
international political lightning rod for the opponents of globalization." 9
Indeed, until very late in the process, the research and negotiations in-
volved solely investment experts. ELSA and the Environment
Directorate were not asked for advice for the simple reason that their
fields of expertise were not seen as relevant.
Second, the OECD had a successful record in hosting international
negotiations. As described in Part I, OECD Recommendations and Deci-
sions are adopted every year, often involving intensive negotiation
among Member countries. Moreover, the OECD has served as the forum
for complex multilateral negotiations of freestanding treaties. During the
same period as the Wider Investment Instrument Project, for example,
the OECD successfully served as the negotiating forum for an interna-
tional bribery convention.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the OECD's restricted mem-
bership increased the likelihood of success. Aside from the newest
members, all the OECD governments had worked closely together in the
past for the purpose of liberalizing investment flows and could be ex-
pected to favor an MAI. After all, by the time of the MAI all the OECD
Member countries had removed exchange controls and further rolled
back restrictions on inward FDI through unilateral steps or as part of
118. As described above, however, a number of the agreements in the Uruguay Round
had also dealt with investment issues, in particular the TRIMS Agreement, the TRIPS Agree-
ment, and GATS. The OECD did not hold a monopoly on investment policy expertise.
119. In what now seems a foreshadowing of problems to come, the negotiations were
originally referred to as the Multilateral Investment Agreement. Realizing that the acronym
("MIA") would make it too easy to lampoon the agreement as "Missing In Action," the
United States persuaded the Secretariat to opt for the more neutral acronym of MAI. See
Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate Professor
of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
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regional trade agreements within the EU and NAFTA.'2° OECD Mem-
bers accounted for 85% of all FDI outflows.'
2
'
While none of the OECD interviews mentioned this, it seems likely
that the concerted opposition by developing countries in the WTO pro-
vided a strong incentive to negotiate the MAI at the OECD. If it were
not possible to gain broad developing country support for global invest-
ment rules, then negotiations at fora with inclusive membership such as
the WTO or UNCTAD would prove fruitless. The like-mindedess of
OECD Member countries is the raison d'etre for the organization's ex-
istence. Why not, then, commence MAI negotiations in a forum where
success seemed more assured? It is interesting to note that the OECD
Council's decision to commence negotiations of the MAI came shortly
after the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. In retrospect, the shift of in-
vestment negotiations from the WTO to the OECD certainly suggests a
causal influence.
22
3. The Negotiations
This progress in fostering FDI, however, posed an obstacle to nego-
tiations, for the main concern of the negotiating parties lay not in further
liberalizing investments within the OECD. As Rainer Geiger, Deputy
Director of the Directorate for Fiscal, Financial and Enterprise Affairs
during the MAI negotiations has noted, "[b]y 1995, almost all exchange
controls on capital accounts and most horizontal restrictions on foreign
investment (i.e. authorization procedures for all categories and sectors)
had disappeared within OECD member countries."'2 3 The goal of the
MAI was not simply to strengthen the OECD Codes. Rather, it appears
that the goal of the MAI negotiations was to open up FDI opportunities
120. See HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 3, 8-9.
121. See Picciotto, supra note 93, at 744.
122. It is instructive to contrast the strong institutional reasons for basing the MAI nego-
tiations at the OECD with the apparently trivial benefits the OECD offered as a forum for the
OECD Export Credit Arrangement.
In the case of the Arrangement... the norms and rules of the OECD, under whose
aegis the regime functions, seem to have had little effect on the negotiations. At
various times, the issue was negotiated at G-5 (later G-7) summit meeting, IMF
meetings, GATr, the Berne Union, and the OECD. The OECD became the institu-
tional home of the regime largely because-unlike GATI', whose institutional
design actually threatened to impede cooperation in this area-it offered a neutral
forum. The OECD contributed neither a set of metanorms nor opportunities for is-
sue linkage, but simply a location for treasury and credit agency officials to
continue what they were already doing.
Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 198.
123. Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 467, 468 (1998).
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in developing countries that restricted FDI-countries that, by defini-
tion, were not members of the OECD' Given this, one might well ask
why the OECD would be an attractive venue to negotiate a treaty, when
the most important signatories would not be OECD members?
The OECD Member countries appear to have adopted what might be
called a "build it and they will come" strategy of treaty development.' 4
From the outset, it was expected that the MAI would be a free-standing
treaty open to accession by non-Member countries on a negotiated basis.
In many respects this was no different from the history of the GATT.
The original contracting parties in 1947 surely expected that other coun-
tries would accede to the treaty and adopt the GATT's disciplines as the
benefits of liberalized trade become clear. Nor did the Treaty of Rome
and subsequent European Community and Union treaties dissuade hope-
ful applicants for membership despite the requirement that the
established laws must be accepted as a condition to accession.' It was
the explicit strategy of some of the Member countries (and certainly of
the EU) to use the result of OECD negotiations as the basis for an even
broader WTO agreement on direct investment.16 The communiqu6 from
the 1996 OECD ministerial meeting, in fact, declared the Member coun-
tries' "interest in beginning an examination of trade and investment in
the WTO and working towards a consensus, perhaps including the pos-
sibility of negotiations."'27
Though not well known, a similar strategy had been followed at the
OECD in the 1980s in the field of transboundary movements of hazard-
ous waste. Seeking to avoid the contentiousness and potential
grandstanding by the more broad-based membership of UNEP, the Envi-
ronment Directorate facilitated the negotiation and passage of a series of
low-profile OECD decisions restricting the export of hazardous waste
from Member countries. These decisions formed the basis for later ne-
gotiations conducted by U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) for the
124. See HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE, supra note 5, at 267.
125. The recent land mines convention provides a variant on this. The first negotiating
conference concluded with fifty nations pledging to ban landmines, yet the final treaty, a little
over a year later, had over a hundred signatories. Id.
126. In the May 1997 draft of the MAI, the EU inserted language to this effect. See Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The MAI Negotiating Text (as of 24
April 1998), at Preamble (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/
fdi/mai/maitext.pdf (last modified Mar. 16, 2000) ("Wishing that this Agreement enhances
international co-operation with respect to investment and the development of world-wide rules
on foreign direct investment in the framework of the world trading system as embodied in the
World Trade Organization.") [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text]. See also Burt, supra note
92, at 1018.
127. William Witherell, An Agreement on Investment, OECD OBSERVER, Oct.-Nov.
1996, at 7-8.
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agreement that eventually became the Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and the Disposal.'
2
1
To assume simply that what had worked before in the context of hazard-
ous waste would work again, however, does beg the question of why
developing countries would sign a treaty they had not negotiated. To
later critics of the MAI negotiations, the "build it and they will come"
model of treaty formation was simple arrogance on the part of developed
nations.
The divergence of views justifying the OECD as the site for the
MAI-institutional competence versus restricted membership-is strik-
ing. Perhaps it simply reflects the chimeric nature of the MAI story, but
after interviewing participants one is left with near schizophrenic confu-
sion. From the secretariat's perspective, the negotiations were viewed as
a dull, uncontroversial, technical exercise of harmonization, best per-
formed by technocrats within the OECD. From an outsider's
perspective, the OECD's selection as the forum for the MAI smacks
more of a cunning plan to encourage liberalization of developing coun-
tries' FDI controls by circumventing developing country participation in
the drafting of the text.
This last charge may be overly harsh, however, for the shadow of
the WTO was always in the negotiating room. Non-Member countries
were invited to participate as observers and, a year after negotiations had
commenced, eight nations were actively involved.'29 The meetings were
also open to WTO observers and to the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank when the agenda concerned their interests. Interestingly,
though, no similar invitation was extended to UNCTAD, which had
been directed by its members in 1996 to work on a "possible multilateral
framework on investment."'3 °
Moreover, despite the later assertions of MAI critics, MAI negotia-
tions were never concealed or held covertly. To the contrary, the
activities were announced in OECD press releases, articles were pub-
lished in the organization's magazine, the OECD Observer, and many of
the conference papers were posted on the OECD Internet website created
for the MAI in June 1996. Indeed the OECD held an early press confer-
ence to discuss issues concerning negotiation of the MAI and no one
showed up. This confirmed CIME's view that negotiation of the MAI
128. See HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE, supra note 5, at 860-62 (recounting the his-
tory of the Basel Convention).
129. These included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Hong Kong, China, Latvia,
Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic.
130. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 20. This snub further supports the possibility that
choice of the OECD as a negotiating forum was influenced by its restrictive membership.
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was purely a technical harmonization exercise and that there was no
public interest in the matter.' With the exception of NAFTA, which is
more a trade than an investment treaty, none of the previous BITs had
ever been met with outrage or even interest by NGOs. Given this intense
indifference to the MAI from the outset, why did an effective global
coalition of labor, environmental, and other groups formed explicitly
against the MAI just two years later?
4. The Tide Turns: Concerted, International
Opposition by Civil Society
The draft MAI, as originally proposed, was based upon the princi-
ples of national treatment, most favored nation treatment, and
transparency. It would have restrained governments from treating for-
eign and local investments differently, moving closer to a baseline of
non-discrimination. Unlike the TRIMS Agreement, the MAI had a wide
scope, broadly defining both FDI and the range of "investment-
distorting" measures.12 The agreement sought to harmonize upward by
creating mechanisms addressing standstill and rollback of investment
measures.'33 Indeed the MAI was less an attempt to regulate FDI than an
effort to deregulate FDI flows. It is beyond the scope of this study to
examine the MAI's text in detail, but it is important to recognize that,
despite the reassurances of its proponents, the MAI did more than simply
harmonize BITs. Three substantive concerns need to be explained in or-
der to understand the concerted opposition by NGOs.
The first concern, focusing on style, has already been discussed. By
deliberately choosing a forum that excluded developing countries, the
OECD Member countries sent a message, intentional or not, that other
countries had no place at the table. While non-Member countries were
131. In a revealing anecdote on how low-profile the MAI exercise was in the interna-
tional policy community, a member of the OECD secretariat related that she was at a U.N.
Commission for Sustainable Development meeting in 1996 when an NGO participant started
denouncing the MAI negotiations as not being transparent. Ironically, the brunt of her ire was
directed not at the OECD but at the European Union, since she repeatedly referred to the MAI
as an "EU or EC instrument." Email from Marilyn Yakowitz, Centre for Co-operation with
Non-Members, OECD, to James Salzman, Associate Professor, Washington College of Law
(October 2, 2000) (on file with author).
132. The MAI defined investment as "every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly
or indirectly by an investor." MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 126, at Art. II(2)(i). This
included "an enterprise," shares, bonds, rights under contracts, claims to money, intellectual
property rights, and "any other tangible and intangible, movable or immovable property and
any related property rights." Id. The TRIMS Agreement, in contrast, regulates only invest-
ments with trade-distorting measures.
133. Standstill measures prohibit the introduction of additional non-conforming meas-
ures. Rollback measures allow only future liberalization of measures.
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permitted to participate as observers and to accede to the final free-
standing treaty, this expressly was not their forum. 3 4 It left the negotia-
tions open to the charge, merited or not, that the proceedings were
secretive because there was something to hide.
The second substantive concern was one of balance. The MAI
clearly gave new rights to MNEs. These included not only national
treatment, MFN, and an expansion of the Hull formula's coverage from
property to contractual rights but also, as will be described below, bind-
ing dispute settlement provisions. The potential benefits for MNEs were
obvious: fewer restrictions on placement (and removal) of their invest-
ments. What would nations receive in return for giving up sovereign
control over inward investments? One could argue that the quid pro quo
would arise in the form of greater flows of FDI, increased economic
growth, and improved social welfare from this new wealth. This was a
variant on the refrain that "a rising tide lifts all boats," heard so often in
trade and development debates. But there was very real concern that the
MAI without linkages, that is without explicit social, labor and environ-
mental protections, created investors' rights without balancing them with
similar responsibilities. Focusing on rights and ignoring counterbalanced
obligations would create a one-sided agreement. As the Canadian Labor
Council charged, the MAI was:
a 'charter of rights for corporations.' It's all about trade, and it
ignores society, the environment and human need.... [It] gives
rights to investors and corporations but requires nothing in re-
turn. The MAI puts no obligations on corporations to create
jobs, respect workers' rights or protect the environment....
Many Canadian governments give subsidies, tax breaks and
other support to Canadian companies to support job creation,
training, research and development. The MAI calls this
'discrimination' against foreign investors and would stop it. The
MAI may even go further and prohibit government rules that say
companies receiving public dollars must create jobs in return.'
134. A more subtle point bears mentioning, as well. While its proponents claimed that
the MAI simply harmonized the points in common among existing BITs, the multitude of
BITs were "bottom up agreements," with key terms negotiated between each country on an ad
hoc basis. The MAI, by contrast, was explicitly intended as a "top down" agreement, setting
the same basic terms for all investment agreements.
135. Canadian Labour Council, MAI Alert: What the MAI Means for Workers, at
http://www.clc-ctc.ca/news/3worker.html (last modified June 30, 2000) [hereinafter Canadian
Council]. As a columnist in the San Francisco Bay Guardian wrote, "[u]nder [the] MAI,
local, regional, and federal governments could no longer make low-interest loans to local
businesses, cut taxes for businesses that hire members of local communities, or give minority-
owned or environmentally conscious companies preference in the awarding of public-works
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The European Parliament adopted a resolution framing the issue in
starker terms, stating that the draft MAI "reflects an imbalance between
the rights and obligations of investors, guaranteeing the latter full rights
and protection while the signatory states are taking on burdensome obli-
gations which might leave their populations unprotected.'
36
What omissions were these critics referring to? The largest concern
centered on corrosive competition-the fear that in some cases thirst for
FDI can lead to a race-to-the-bottom among countries as local and na-
tional governments lower social and environmental standards in
competition to attract foreign investment. The tax breaks offered by U.S.
states bidding for a new car plant provides an obvious example of fiscal
competition.'37 Labor groups charge that some countries also use their
lack of labor rights as an incentive for companies to invest.13 The
downward pressure on environmental standards to attract FDI has been a
source of heated controversy, as well. 39
A prime example of the MAI negotiations' failure to address the
potential of a race-to-the-bottom was its treatment of investment incen-
tives-the lowering of labor or environmental standards as a means to
attract FDI. This issue had been addressed directly in NAFTA Article
1114(2), which provided that parties should not waive or derogate from
health, safety and environmental measures in order to encourage "the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention in its territory of an
investment or an investor.' '40 Labor and environmental groups were con-
cerned that absent similar safeguards in the MAI, countries might lower
contracts." Gabriel Roth, NAFTA on Crack, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, http://www.sfbg.com/
News/32/03/Features/mai.html (Oct. 15, 1997). As discussed infra notes 159-160, it is not at
all clear that the MAI would have prohibited these activities. As another critic observed,
the MAI draft text is woefully lacking in labor rights substance. Negotiators set
forth no clear norms of behavior for governments or multinational investors, cre-
ated no binding obligations on them, set up no mechanism to scrutinize government
or enterprise treatment of workers, and established no penalties, economic or oth-
erwise, when investors violate workers' rights. Second, the MAI lags far behind
other international trade regimes and their more extensive and sophisticated treat-
ment of labor rights. Fifteen years ago, the MAI's labor rights language might have
been worthy of attention. Today, it has been overtaken by developments in the la-
bor rights field that make the MAI negotiators' attempts at dealing with labor rights
seem shallow.
Compa, supra note 53, at 687.
136. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 40.
137. Allen R. Myerson, 0 Governor, Won't You Buy Me a Mercedes Plant? N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at Cl..
138. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 141-42.
139. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons
for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REv. 1331 (1997).
140. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
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protective standards. And even if countries did not actively lower stan-
dards to entice investment, this provided no reassurance against a
'chilling' effect-pressure not to strengthen labor and environmental
standards out of concern over potential loss of FDI.'
4
'
The MAI's dispute settlement provisions provided a further cause
for NGO concern. Few would argue that the dispute settlement provi-
sions of the WTO provide the teeth that give the new institution a
fearsome bite. Even the provisions provided in the earlier GATT, while
vulnerable to veto by a Member country, still gave the trade regime
greater sanctioning influence than other institutional frameworks. Fol-
lowing this model and that of the NAFTA (as well as strong lobbying
from the United States), the MAI proposed a binding dispute settlement
process. As described earlier, expropriation has long been a worry for
foreign investors. The MAI addressed this issue head on, prohibiting
direct confiscation of assets as well as "any other measure or measures
having equivalent effect."
Critics, however, feared that investors would make use of this provi-
sion to file claims for compensation resulting from regulatory takings,
claims not available to local counterparts. Canada's experience under
NAFTA provided a sobering preview of how such investor protections
could play out. In 1997, the Canadian government banned the use of a
fuel additive, MMT, which was a source of harmful air pollutants and
whose use was already restricted in the United States. The manufacturer,
the Virginia-based Ethyl Corporation, sued for $251 million, claiming
that the regulatory action had been the equivalent of a confiscation of its
assets. Fearful of losing the case, the Canadian government settled the
suit for $13 million. 42 California recently announced it would phase out
the use of the gasoline additive, MTBE, because leaks from pipes had
contaminated the ground water in Santa Monica, Lake Tahoe and 10,000
wells throughout California. Methanex Corporation, the Canadian manu-
facturer of MTBE, saw its stock drop $150 million in the days following
the announcement and has filed a suit through NAFTA for $970 mil-
lio n .
43
In each of these cases and others pending,'" foreign companies have
filed suit seeking compensation for actions they claim amount to expro-
141. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Ex-
plaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
142. See Alan Swan, International Decision: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on
Jurisdiction, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 159 (2000).
143. Samrat Ganguly, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's
Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 150 (1999).
144. As of late 1999, eight investment claims had been brought under NAFTA. For ex-
ample:
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priation in settings where domestic companies in the same situation
would clearly have no cause of action. The American producers of
MTBE have no regulatory takings claim in the United States. As a lead-
ing Canadian paper's editorial stated, "that puts the right of foreigner
corporations to make profits on an equal footing with a country's duty to
protect the health of its people.' ' 45 Echoing this concern, the Canadian
Labor Council charged that under the MAI,
corporations will have the right to launch expensive challenges,
and demand compensation for government policies in front of
international trade disputes panels. These panels are non-elected
and inaccessible-they care only about narrow trade issues, not
broader social goals.
46
TUAC was the first labor group to become involved in the MAI ne-
gotiations, and recognized early the potential implications of the
agreement for labor rights. It started providing its opinions to the MAI
negotiators in 1996, though its recommendations were ignored initially.
TUAC initially called for the inclusion of four elements:
- incorporation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises in the preamble and annexing the full text of the
Guidelines;
- a binding obligation for all MAI parties to create National
Contact Points to implement the Guidelines;
A U.S. company running a hazardous waste disposal facility in Mexico is seeking
$90 million in compensation from Mexico for losses incurred when the local gov-
ernment refused to permit operation of the plant because of its discovery that the
local geology made it likely that the waste treated at the plant would contaminate
local water supplies. Another U.S. toxic waste disposal company has claimed that
Canada should pay it at least $10 million for losses arising out of a 15-month Ca-
nadian ban on the export of a particularly volatile hazardous waste....
The Loewen Group, a Canadian funeral services firm, brought a NAFTA invest-
ment claim against the United States after it lost a civil contract suit brought by a
competing US funeral services company in Mississippi court. The court awarded
the US company $500 million and Loewen, which had filed for bankruptcy, was
unable to pay the requisite 125% bond to appeal the case. Loewen brought the
NAFTA claim on the basis that the suit against it violated NAFTA's national
treatment, minimum treatment and expropriation provisions.
J. Martin Wagner, Nature Beyond the Nation State Symposium: International Investment,
Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 465, 466, 487
(1999).
145. NAFTA Has Become Pollution Permit, THE TORONTO STAR, June 21, 1999, avail-
able at LEXIS, All Sources, News File.
146. See Canadian Labour Council, supra note 135.
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- a commitment in the preamble to protect, enhance and en-
force basic workers' rights;
- and a binding obligation that parties will not seek to attract
foreign investment by suppressing domestic labor standards
or violating internationally recognized workers' rights.
4 7
On its face, inclusion of the OECD Guidelines and requirements to
create National Contact Points would seem uncontroversial since the
Guidelines had been formally adopted by the same body almost two
decades earlier. The Guidelines' status would remain unchanged; they
would remain voluntary within the binding MAI. TUAC hoped inclusion
would energize the dormant Guidelines, raising their profile and pro-
viding labor activists with a renewed impetus to direct the conduct of
MNEs. Those opposed to inclusion of the Guidelines and obligations to
create National Contact Points, in particular Australia, New Zealand and
Mexico, argued that linkage was inappropriate and the ILO was the
proper forum to address labor issues."48 Others in the MAI negotiating
group contended that "it is neither appropriate nor possible for the MAI
to interfere with the private practices and decisions of specific compa-
nies.... What private entities decide to do in their own right is not, and
should not according to the majority, be covered by MAI.', 149 Indeed in
early informal discussions between the TUAC and OECD secretariats on
addressing labor issues in the MAI, TUAC was told it "was pushing
yesterday's agenda." Before the explosion of NGO interest, TUAC was
told that the only deal that might be possible would have to make unam-
biguously clear that the Guidelines were non-binding. In the event that
governments agreed to incorporate the Guidelines in the MAI, they
could only be annexed to the Final Act of the MAI (which would in ef-
fect be a preamble to the preamble) and not to the Agreement itself.
147. This last provision was based on the provision in Article 1114 of NAFTA that for-
bids the lowering of standards to attract investment, although it is stricter. Article 1114's
requirement is hortatory ("should") while TUAC called for binding language ("will"). Trade
Union Advisory Committee, Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, The
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: The Treatment of Labour Issues, TUAC Briefing Note
- February 1997, http://www.tuac.org/statement/communiq/majOl.htm (last modified June
27, 1998).
148. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 45. This argument against linkage is similar to the
debate over the introduction to the Labour Standards Study, discussed supra, as well as de-
bates heard in the WTO about environmental policy maintaining that multilateral
environmental agreements are the proper means to address environmental issues, rather than
agreements in the WTO.
149. Burt, supra note 92, at 1047 n.262 (quoting Anders Ahnlid, Special Topics, in
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY 1996 4, 20,
OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(96)157 (1996)).
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It is important, though, to recognize that TUAC never publicly op-
posed the MAI. They saw their role not as trying to kill the MAI but,
rather, in serving as a constructive voice of labor opinion and expertise
and in using their periodic place at the table as a source of information
and indirect participant in the negotiations. The first TUAC Plenary Ses-
sion following the launch of negotiations in May 1995 adopted a twin
track negotiating strategy. The national affiliates would lobby their own
governments and join coalitions with civil society groups. TUAC would
push for the strongest possible language on labor issues, but not state its
support or opposition for the MAI until its final substance became clear.
This challenging but nonconfrontational role was seen as essential to
ensuring long-term credibility with the Member countries and within the
OECD. As TUAC's Senior Policy Advisor has described,
On something like the MAI, we neither sought, nor would affili-
ates have wanted us to "negotiate" on their behalf on the MAI as
a whole. The OECD is not a tripartite body like the ILO. So we
can't negotiate and trade issues off. Our input is more subtle and
depends on our ability to convey a message to government peo-
ple in Paris and the OECD Secretariat at all levels as to what's
workable and what our people will accept. By opposing the MAI
we would have lost that channel of influence and a lot of credi-
bility because by saying no, governments could have
legitimately ignored us as we would have nothing to contrib-
ute .... They could have said "what's the point in discussing
this as TUAC has said no." Also, by trying to carve out a posi-
tion that all can agree to, an organization tends to get the lowest
common denominator prevailing .... 15 0
It was taken as a given that developed countries would move toward
a MAI somewhere, and TUAC thought that labor's influence would
likely be greater at the OECD than the WTO, the likely alternate forum.
From this perspective, ironically, TUAC's strategy of building an
agreement within the OECD prior to negotiations at another forum par-
alleled the strategy of the OECD Member countries. Outside the
negotiations, TUAC served as an important clearing-house of informa-
tion for labor groups and worked closely with active NGOs such as the
150. Email from Roy Jones, TUAC Senior Policy Advisor, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor, Washington College of Law (August 2, 2000) (on file with author). Loss of credi-
bility would also have increased the probability of TUAC being denied access to documents.
This access is particularly important when national affiliates are denied access by their gov-
ernments (as was often the case with the MAI).
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World Wide Fund for Nature and Amnesty International in developing
strategies to amend the draft agreement.
While TUAC never publicly opposed the MAI, other NGOs did, and
did so effectively. Speaking to those involved in the campaign, many
described the NGO opposition as a wildfire. Indeed, the rapidity and ef-
fectiveness of NGO opposition to the MAI was unprecedented. From the
end of 1995, a small number of NGOs started to follow the negotiations
and oppose both the goals and content of the MAI process. At the start,
these were primarily environmental and social rather than labor groups.
Labor groups were not far behind, however. The OECD held an informal
meeting with interested NGOs in December of 1996. While the OECD
was open in terms of announcing the process of the negotiations and
their general status, in keeping with OECD procedures the internal
documents were restricted. In February 1997, however, the Public Citi-
zen group, founded by Ralph Nader, got hold of the current Chairman's
draft (i.e., the consolidated negotiating text up to that point) and posted it
on the Internet.'5 ' This posting provided the catalyst for widespread and
hard line opposition of NGOs against the MAI. Just two months later, a
more formal meeting for NGOs was hosted by members of the Negoti-
ating Group and secretariat officials. While the OECD's first
consultative meeting with interested groups about the MAI had been in
an empty room, the October briefing attracted over 70 representatives
from 30 groups around the world.'52 In a matter of mere months, through
the Internet and e-mail, a global campaign against the MAI had come
into being. Drafts and bulletins on the MAI were now regularly posted
on a host of NGO websites.'53 By 1998, anti-MAI campaigns were active
in more than half of the OECD countries as well as many developing
countries.'5 4 The mood of these activities is well captured in the descrip-
tion of the Preamble Collaborative, an NGO with only three employees.
The Preamble Collaborative was one of more than 600 organi-
zations in nearly 70 countries expressing vehement opposition to
the treaty, often in apocalyptic terms. The Collaborative's exten-
sive World Wide Web site-featuring fact sheets, congressional
testimony, position papers, and issue briefs-was part of a tidal
wave of electronically amplified public opposition to the
151. Stephen J. Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalization, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall
1998, at 97-98.
152. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 22.
153. See, e.g., Global Trade Watch, Public Citizen, Stop MAI ... and No MAI in IMF,
WTO, FTAA, or TAFTA!, at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/MAl/maihome.html (last updated
Jan. 3, 2000).
154. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 27.
[Vol. 21:769
Summer 2000] Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions
MAI.... Suddenly, what had been a working document among
29 parties became available to anyone with a computer and a
modem. And everyone with a computer and a modem got in-
volved. OECD representatives quickly became the targets of
unprecedented scrutiny. "If a negotiator says something to
someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet
within an hour, all over the world," boasted the head of the
Council of Canadians, a citizens' interest group claiming more
than 100,000 members.
5
NGOs repeated the main substantive arguments against the MAI de-
scribed above and expressed a more general anxiety that the MAI
represented yet another significant step in the rush toward greater
globalization, ignoring issues beyond trade flows and commerce. Re-
flecting this concern, much of the anti-MAI criticism came to voice the
rhetorically powerful charge that a critical negotiation with impacts on
the lives of people around the world was being negotiated in secret by a
secretive institution. The claim of a shadowy international organization
creating the "New World Order" resonated powerfully among those with
reservations about the pace and consequences of globalization.' 6 Was
this mere rhetoric? Certainly, to some NGOs, the lack of specificity pro-
vided on the terms of the MAI negotiations provided clear evidence that
it was a closed-door operation.
On top of these occasional hyperbolic assertions, it must be added
that a number of NGOs made claims with no basis in fact at all. There
were assertions that the MAI would establish protectionist standards
against developing countries and that if the MAI had been in force Nel-
son Mandela would still be in prison.' It is not news, of course, to
observe that the advent of the Internet and e-mail is revolutionizing the
techniques and influence of NGOs, permitting the creation of global
campaigns remarkably quickly. The experience of the MAI is a case in
point that the increased ease and rapidity of information dissemination
applies equally to misinformation. 5 8 In this setting the OECD's lack of
experience in managing highly contentious negotiations proved fatal. As
the OECD's Secretary-General later acknowledged, the OECD was
155. Kobrin, supra note 151, at 97.
156. The Canadian NGO, the Council of Canadians, for example, asserted that "this
global investment treaty constitutes a power grab for transnational corporations that would
end up hijacking the fundamental democratic rights and freedoms of peoples all over the
world." HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 37.
157. Kobrin, supra note 151, at 104.
158. See James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the
Service Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411, 466-67 (1999) (describing the growth and implica-
tions of NGO virtual campaigns).
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badly outgunned in the world of public relations. The OECD's reaction
to growing NGO attacks-more press conferences and enhancing the
MAI home-page on its website-had the same effect as whistling into a
storm.
The impact of a global NGO campaign against the MAI was quickly
felt. By the time the Chairman's draft was issued in early 1998, with the
exception of mandating National Contact Points, most of TUAC's de-
mands had been met. 59 Despite earlier protests by some Member
countries, text was inserted to prohibit the lowering of social and envi-
ronmental standards to attract FDI, to ensure that treaty obligations
would not prevent governments from maintaining (or heightening) pro-
tective social and environmental standards, and to ban claims by foreign
159. The four TUAC demands excerpted earlier were placed on their website early dur-
ing the negotiations (before TUAC had seen a negotiating draft). Additional demands
(excerpted below) were provided to TUAC national affiliates in the late Summer of 1997,
after the MAI had risen to international prominence and the Chairman's draft had been
leaked. It is interesting to note that TUAC's demands had gone beyond purely labor issues.
Their basic demands for an acceptable MAI included:
I. Strong reference to core labour standards in the Preamble, and to any fu-
ture ILO Declaration on core labour rights, but no reference to the ILO as
the only competent body to deal with them. A binding clause on core la-
bour standards subject to dispute settlement, and/or accession to the
agreement to be dependent on proven adherence to core labour standards.
2. Binding clause on domestic labour standards, subject to dispute settlement,
and covering all investments and investors, not specific ones. A binding
clause covering environmental standards.
3. The OECD Guidelines to be annexed to the MAI itself and not the Final
Act. The requirement to set up National Contact Points to be obligatory on
all Parties to the Agreement, with no national exemptions. Competence for
the Guidelines to be passed to the Parties Group dealing with the MAI.
Any forthcoming Review of the Guidelines to focus, inter alia, on tight-
ening up the implementation process.
4. A strong government's "right to regulate" clause, and further revisions as
regards "performance requirements".
5. Further revisions to dispute settlement procedures, (deleting investor to
state), and a mechanism to be found to allow trade unions to bring forward
complaints, and this to be clarified in relation to point 6.
6. Further work on the "expropriation" clause, including that as regards
measures "tantamount to expropriation" and to ensure that strike action,
among other things is specifically excluded from its coverage.
7. Revise the general exception clause on monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies, BOP, and capital transactions so as to allow the imposition of capital
controls, for example Chile type "speed bumps" as a general rule.
8. Open ended exceptions, i.e., not subject to standstill and rollback, must be
allowed as a general rule, including those specifically for public and not
for profit sectors including health and social services, education and public
procurement.
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investors for compensation for losses caused by non-discriminatory
regulatory actions.'6
These concessions, however, came too late, for the NGO campaign
had taken on a life of its own in domestic politics. In early 1998, seeking
to resurrect the chances of renewed Fast Track authority from Congress,
the Clinton Administration sought NGO support by denouncing the MAI
as "fatally flawed" and demanding that it be reconsidered. Domestic op-
position also flared up in Paris, where demonstrations in February took
aim at the impact of the MAI on France's ability to protect its cultural
heritage.' In response, the MAI negotiations were formally suspended
for six months for a period of assessment by the negotiating parties. On
October 14, one week before negotiations were scheduled to resume,
Prime Minister Jospin of France released an official statement in the
Chamber of Deputies, declaring that since the MAI posed "fundamental
problems with respect to the sovereignty of states" and was in its current
159. The late draft of the MAI addressed labor rights in three separate provisions. The
preamble provided that parties renewed "their commitment to the Copenhagen Declaration of
the World Summit on Social Development... and to observance of internationally recognized
core labour standards," recognized that the ILO was the appropriate body to set and enforce
such standards,
In the body of the text, in the section "Not Lowering Standards," the text stated it was
"inappropriate" for a party "to encourage investment by relaxing... [core] labour standards"
and, if this occurred, "if a Party considers that another Party has offered such encouragement,
it may request consultations with the other Party, and the two Parties shall consult with a view
to avoiding any such encouragement." A bracketed alternative proposed a party
"[shall][should] not waive or otherwise derogate from... [domestic] labor standards" to en-
courage foreign investment in the country.
Finally, an annex was proposed describing the OECD Guidelines as "a joint recommen-
dation by participating governments to multinational enterprises operating in their territory...
to help multinational enterprises ensure that their operations are in harmony with other na-
tional policies of the countries in which they operate that encouraged parties" and
encouraging parties "to participate in the Guidelines work of the [OECD] in order to promote
cooperation ... and to facilitate the maintenance of consensus." See Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, CHAIRMAN'S NOTE ON ENVIRONMENT AND RELATED
MATTERS AND ON LABOUR, OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98) 10, Mar. 11, 1998, available at
http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/fdi/mai/labenv.htm (last modified Feb. 18, 2000). See
generally Compa, supra note 53, at 686-87.
The main outstanding point was over how to treat violations of core labor standards. At
this point in the negotiations, the ILO had not yet adopted its Declaration on Fundamental
Rights and Principles at Work, so the OECD's Labour Standards Study was the most
authoritative identification of core rights (freedom of association, rights to collective bargain-
ing, etc). The Chairman's draft envisaged consultations to address violations of core labor
rights, not a binding dispute settlement mechanism. Apparently Mexico (which had dealt with
similar issues in NAFTA), New Zealand, and the United Kingdom strongly opposed such a
mechanism, arguing that this clause would prevent developing countries from joining any
eventual MAI, something that the OECD as a whole feared. In interviews for this article,
TUAC equally strongly stated that it would have opposed the MAI if provisions for binding
dispute settlement had not been included.
161. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 30.
Michigan Journal of International Law
state "unreformable," that France would pull out of the negotiations. One
of the MAI's strongest early proponents, France held out the possibility
of resuming negotiations but only on "an entirely new basis."'62 Its aban-
donment of negotiations meant the EU had to follow, effectively
dooming the OECD's negotiation of an MAI. Reflecting this course of
events, the OECD issued a press release on December 3, 1998 stating
that "Negotiations on the MAI are no longer taking place."'
63
Negotiations on the MAI have halted at the OECD, although discus-
sions are continuing at a technical level on some of the issues that
caused difficulty in the prior negotiations. No agreement has been
reached whether the issue of an MAI-type agreement will be discussed
as an integral part of the WTO Millennial Round, though it is widely
assumed that any future MAI negotiations will take place at the WTO,
an IGO with more experience in hosting multilateral negotiations, a
larger membership, and no stranger to volatile controversy.
5. Lessons from the MAI
Why did the MAI fail at the OECD, and what role did labor rights
play in its demise? The MAI failed for three interrelated reasons-the
agreement was substantively difficult, offered few benefits, and became
a symbolic target despite itself. At the outset, leaving aside concerns of
public relations or labor and environmental protection, it is important to
realize the political challenge inherent in negotiating the MAI. Despite
initial expectations that the MAI amounted to little more than a technical
harmonization exercise, the MAI would have proven a difficult agree-
ment to negotiate no matter where it took place-the OECD, WTO or
UNCTAD. The MAI negotiation allowed parties to enter reservations
and, by the time talks broke down in 1998, over 600 reservations had
been entered, ranging from national security, public order, and cultural
diversity to exemptions for state and local governments. These would
have necessarily been whittled down regardless of the negotiating site, a
challenging process by any standard. Moreover, as the negotiations con-
tinued parties seemed to move farther apart rather than closer together.
Seeking to avoid deal-breaking disputes, the Negotiating Group de-
cided early on to take the key issue of taxation off the table. The United
States and France could not agree on subsidies so they, too, were taken
off the table. But even with these major concerns out of play, going into
the negotiations the two major power blocs had very different goals in
mind. As one observer of the negotiations has noted:
162. Id. at 31.
163. See id. at 32.
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[The U.S.], which had pressed strongly for the launching of the
MAI, wished in particular to make progress in relation to (i) the
screening of investments (prior authorisation), (ii) an effective
dispute settlement mechanism, and (iii) the imposition of trans-
parency obligations and effective disciplines on exceptions for
cultural industries and REIOs [Regional Economic Integration
Measures (a regional organization of states that have reduced
investment barriers among themselves)]. By contrast, the. EC
and its members were concerned to limit extraterritoriality.'
64
The lack of agreement on key issues had two important conse-
quences for the negotiations. First, by taking major items off the table,
there was little left for horse-trading. In WTO negotiating rounds, while
some subjects (such as agriculture in the Uruguay Round) are clearly out
of bounds, many other important trade sectors are up for grabs. As a re-
sult, giving in one area can be compensated or bartered for advantage in
a separate sector. A nation might give on services in exchange for more
intellectual property protections. The key measure, at the end of the day,
is whether the nation's trading and economic status is strengthened or
weakened by the total package. This explains why trade rounds are a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition. With the MAI, in contrast, there was little
to trade or barter. Negotiated outside a trade round, the MAI provided
few chips to exchange, and far fewer once taxation and subsidies were
removed from consideration.
As described above, the real prospects for gain were not increased
FDI in developed countries but in developing countries. There exist few
barriers to investment among OECD countries and therefore no pressing
need for an MAI within the OECD. This explains the choice of the
"build it and they will come" model. For such a model to work, there
must be a sense by outsiders that they will miss advantages unless they
sign the treaty, even if they did not meaningfully participate in the nego-
tiations.'65 The frenzied campaigns in Sweden and Finland to join the EU
164. Id. at26.
165. Geoffrey Garrett makes a similar observation in explaining the lack of influence
(and acquiescence) of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Ireland in development of the Single
European Act:
Why were France and Germany better able to further their preferences than were
the other members of the EC? ... Following Albert Hirschman's classic argument
about asymmetric economic dependence, their bargaining position vis-A-vis the
northern states was extremely weak. Put simply, the less developed countries were
in greater need of access to the markets and resources of the wealthier EC states.
Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Com-
munity's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533, 546 n.2 (1992) (citing ALBERT HIRSCHMAN,
NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE (expanded ed., 1980)).
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in 1996 are cases in point. Despite the promising start of eight non-
Member countries participating in the negotiations, the level and inten-
sity of opposition to the MAI prevented the early momentum from
taking off. Once it became clear that few countries outside the OECD
would support the MAI, its potential attraction was greatly lessened.
With few substantive areas under discussion and diminishing likelihood
of broad developing country accession, the rationale for an MAI became
less than compelling.
In retrospect, both the OECD secretariat and the Member country
governments clearly underestimated the political sensitivity and impli-
cations of an MAI. They thought negotiation of the MAI was a technical
exercise, requiring expertise the OECD was uniquely well suited to pro-
vide. As a result, the country delegates failed to ask for high-level
political support at the outset. The realization that the seemingly techni-
cal matters had significant political implications came too late in the
game. In retrospect, too, it's clear that the OECD had neither the capac-
ity nor experience to respond to a concerted NGO campaign. The OECD
as an institution was not used to being in the public spotlight, and the
DAFFE Directorate even less so.
In this regard, the MAI story raises important issues for the role of
civil society, and particularly labor and environmental NGOs, in inter-
national negotiations. In the coming years, scholars may well look back
to the international NGO campaign against the MAI as a turning point in
the dash toward globalization. As the European Parliament concluded at
the time, the MAI became "a symbol. It crystallises the demands and
frustrations of civil society with respect to globalisation.', 66 While
TUAC might have been willing to stop the pressure once its demands
were met, the more active NGOs would not. Some were still convinced
that the MAI was a fundamentally flawed treaty. Others, though, were
driving home a point about realpolitik-the power of organized civil
society to bury liberalization agreements at IGOs.
Perhaps the tale would have turned out differently had CIME ac-
tively included other OECD directorates early on. In fact, this was done
recently during the development of guidelines for corporate governance
and the revision of the OECD Guidelines.' 67 Interviews at the OECD
made it clear that the institution will be far more sensitive to potential
166. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 27 (quoting the Lalumi~re Report, European Parlia-
ment, Rapport intdrimaire sur L'Accord Multilatdral sur l'Investissement (AMI), Paris,
France, Sept. 1998.).
167. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Issues Re-
vised Draft of Its Guidelines for Multinationals for Further Public Comment (Mar. 15, 2000),
at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nwOO-27a.htm. See also discussion infra text accompa-
nying note 213.
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linkages and opportunities for outreach than in the past, engaging in ear-
lier and more frequent consultations with interest groups and civil
society.
In the final analysis, it is easy to conclude the OECD simply was the
wrong institution to satisfy the demands of negotiating the MAI. But this
conclusion is too easy because, despite its shortcomings, the OECD pro-
vided real benefits. As described above, TUAC felt that labor issues
would have been given even less consideration if the MAI negotiations
had taken place at the WTO. From their perspective, the OECD's insti-
tutional structure at least gave labor a place at the table, if only to nibble
at a small number of courses. The Member countries, too, made a strate-
gic decision in choosing the OECD to host the negotiations rather than
larger IGOs. To some extent, the OECD simply provided a convenient
institutional shell. But its limited membership, closed-door proceedings,
low public profile, and deep technical expertise were viewed as impor-
tant competitive institutional advantages when negotiations commenced
in 1995. By 1998, these virtues had become fatal flaws. As a member of
the OECD secretariat who worked closely on the negotiations remarked,
in retrospect the MAI story may be viewed as a defining moment when,
in the face of a steadily rising tide of globalization, a line was drawn in
the sand, and the waters stopped.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
As the previous examples have demonstrated, the OECD possesses a
set of unique and potentially powerful institutional strengths for the
promotion of labor rights. But in understanding the organization's
strengths and weaknesses in other fields, as well as its potential for fu-
ture influence, how should one assess the institution itself?
IGOs reduce transaction costs of cooperative agreements and inter-
actions among sovereign states. They do so by creating and
disseminating information, establishing rules for activities, and moni-
toring and facilitating compliance (through both sanctioning and
reputational mechanisms).' 68 Clearly, however, not all IGOs perform all
168. The net result is nations' expectation of reciprocal behavior. See Garrett, supra note
165, at 534; Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 335; Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 197. More for-
mally, Eugene Skolnikoff has divided the activities of IGOs into four broad categories:
1. Provision of information and minor services (including data gathering and
analysis, facilitation of interstate consultation, suggestions for coordina-
tion).
2. Legislation (creating rules and standards for regulation of activities and
allocation of costs and benefits).
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of these functions or do so with equal effectiveness. In examining the
family of IGOs, or even the subset of United Nations IGOs, one finds
redundancy (both intentional and unintentional) among issue areas. As
political scientists Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye have observed:
69
Different organizations serve different needs. They complement
and compete with each other. There is a role in trade for both the
GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD); in money, for the IMF and the Bank for
International Settlements, and Working Party III of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); in
aid, both for the World Bank and regional banks.... If we lived
in a "first-best" world, this untidy approach to international bu-
reaucracy would be unnecessary. Its appropriateness derives
from the large number of constraints that thwart first-best efforts
to satisfy the diversity of preferences in the political world we
live in.
In a world of IGO overlap, of course, competition inevitably results as
IGOs maneuver for the scarce attention and resources of sovereign
states. In examining the range of OECD activities, one can find exam-
ples that span the functions of IGOs-from creation of information and
rule formation to compliance monitoring and facilitation. What, though,
are the OECD's relative strengths compared to other IGOs? The answer
to this question, and a more revealing analysis of the OECD, lies in fo-
cusing on the two distinguishing strengths of the OECD-the creation of
communities of influence and conditional agenda-setting.
A. Creation of Communities of Influence
In the Introduction to this Article, Anne-Marie Slaughter held out
the OECD as a model for future international organizations.'7° The basis
for her prediction lies in the growth of transgovernmentalism-
cooperative problem-solving by global networks of subparts of the state
such as courts, agencies, legislatures and executives. "These parts,"
Slaughter argues, "are networking with their counterparts abroad, creat-
3. Regulation and adjudication (monitoring adherence to rules, possibly
through inspection, mediation, conciliation, and management of specific
sanctioning procedures).
4. Operations (large-scale research and development, operation of a technol-
ogy or management of resources).
Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 338 (citing Eugene Skolnikoff).
169. Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 336.
170. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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ing a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental
order.... [T]ransgovernmentalism is rapidly becoming the most wide-
spread and effective mode of international governance"'7
As recognized by Slaughter, though often overlooked, the OECD
exercises enormous influence simply through its organizational activi-
ties. The OECD committees regularly bring together governmental
officials from the same functional agencies of its Member countries."
Beyond guiding and informing the secretariat's activities, these repeated
encounters can subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) guide the officials'
attitudes and activities, as well. As a classic international relations article
observed over 25 years ago:
When the same officials meet recurrently, they sometimes de-
velop a sense of collegiality which may be reinforced by their
membership in a common profession, such as economics, phys-
ics, or meteorology. Individual officials may even define their
roles partly in relation to their transnational reference group
rather than in purely national terms .... Regularized patterns of
policy coordination can therefore create attitudes and relation-
ships that will at least marginally change policy or affect its
implementation.'73
Occasionally, such groups develop into epistemic communities, de-
fined as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area."'74 Epistemic
communities play a fundamental role in the development and imple-
mentation of international law and policy. As Peter Haas has
described,'75
in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex
problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the is-
sues for collective debate, proposing scientific policies, and
identifying salient points for negotiation ... [m]embers of tran-
snational epistemic communities can influence state interests
either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by il-
luminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the
decision makers may then deduce their interests. The decision
171. Slaughter, supra note 9, at 184-85.
172. See discussion of the "Rich Man's Club" supra Part I.B.1.
173. Keohane & Nye, supra note 21, at 45.
174. Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordi-
nation, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
175. Id. at 2, 4.
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makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and be-
haviors of other states, thereby increasing the likelihood of
convergent state behavior and international policy coordination,
informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the
epistemic community.
Put simply, by providing a forum for government officials and non-
governmental experts to meet and share research and experiences on
cutting edge policy issues, IGOs can frame the issues for future collec-
tive consideration, lay the groundwork for agreement and identify whose
the influential voices in the policy debate shall be.'76 An obvious exam-
ple of an epistemic community relevant today is the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, created by the World Meteorological Organi-
zation and the United Nations Environment Program to assess the
scientific, technical and socioeconomic information relevant for under-
standing the risk of climate change.'77 Importantly, many of these
groups' members (and others who work closely with the groups in an
informal capacity) are not government officials but, rather, experts
whose influence is both domestic and transnational. Not all groups cre-
ated by IGOs, of course, achieve such a level of authoritative expertise.
At the very least, though, IGOs and their secretariats exercise potentially
considerable power in creating influential international elites of like-
minded officials and technocrats.
7
1
If UNEP and other IGOs such as the ILO and World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) also have the capacity to form such communities, what
sets the OECD apart? The answer is simple-the scale of its activities.
Consider that the OECD's committees, working groups, expert groups
and conferences bring together approximately 40,000 government offi-
cials and experts annually.'79 Inevitably, some of these gatherings
coalesce into a core of identifiable groups of experts that exercise influ-
ence over the delineation of policy challenges and strategic analysis of
176. Krause and Nye argue that "international organizations provide the physical contact
and aura of legitimacy that translate some of these potential transgovernmental coalitions into
active ones... These coalitions form not only through contacts in the countries but sometimes
through an active role by secretariat officials." Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 337-38. While
an epistemic community need not be linked with a specific IGO or necessarily include gov-
ernment officials, this is often the case.
177. For more information, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About
IPCC, at http://www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm (last modified June 27, 2000).
178. This role has long been recognized in international relations scholarship. See Keo-
hane & Nye, supra note 21, at 52 ("International secretariats can be viewed both as catalysts
and as potential members of coalitions; their distinctive resources tend to be information and
an aura of international legitimacy.").
179. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, What is OECD?,
at http://www.oecd.org/about/generallindex.htm (last modified Sept. 29, 2000)
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their resolution. 8 0 The OECD's strong economic research capacity
across a range of governmental activities frees the OECD from the sec-
tor-specific constraints faced by UNCTAD, UNEP, and other single-
issue organizations. By bringing together the OECD secretariat, national
government officials, and nongovernmental experts from different areas,
interdisciplinary research becomes a coherent, focused enterprise.
Linked with these strengths is the OECD's inherent flexibility. Because
its work program is decided by the Member countries, it can transform
its organizational dividing lines, procedures, and priorities to conform to
changing governmental concerns over complex, multilateral issues that
require information creation and dissemination (such as labor standards
and trade flows).' Simply stating that the OECD's creation of expert
networks influences international and domestic policy, however, is in-
sufficient. The key question then becomes whether one can delineate the
shape and substance of such influence. And the answer to that lies in
understanding the OECD's role as a conditional agenda-setter.
B. Conditional Agenda-Setter
There is a rich body of political science scholarship examining the
role of courts, legislatures, and executive bodies in setting political and
legislative agendas.8 2 Within this literature, the work on conditional
agenda setting by scholars examining the European Union is particularly
180. The influence can be indirect, as well:
As such practices [i.e., patterns of regularized policy coordination] become wide-
spread, transgovernmental elite networks are created, linking officials in various
governments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation,
and personal friendship. Even where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and
no major deviations from central policy positions occur, the existence of a sense of
collegiality may permit the development of flexible bargaining behavior in which
concessions need not be requited issue by issue or during each period.
Keohane & Nye, supra note 21, at 46. This observation is equally true for nongovernmental
officials.
181. Keohane & Nye, supra note 21, at 54. Of course, this also means that certain issues
are not addressed, or possibly avoided. It is interesting to note, for example, that the ELSA
Committee has not considered issues of female and child labor as seriously as at the World
Bank, or labor market flexibility as seriously as at the ILO.
182. See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert & Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Strategy and Sophisticated
Voting in the Senate, 56 J. POLITics 349, 350 (1994) ("The literature on sophisticated voting
has centered around two general questions. First, what is the theoretical relation between
sophisticated voting and strategic agenda setting? Second, under what conditions, if any, does
sophisticated voting actually take place in legislatures?"); Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara
Palmer, Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
853 (1996) (examining the U.S. Supreme Court's role in agenda setting); D. Roderick Kiewiet
& Matthew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Deci-
sions, 32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 713, 714 (1988) (examining the influence of veto power on
congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation).
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helpful in understanding the OECD. Much of this work arose as a re-
sponse to the prevailing international relations literature on power
indices. The power index methodology seeks to explain legislative out-
comes by examining voting rules for sovereign states. In the context of
the EU, political scientists analyze the implications of consensus, quali-
fied majority, and simple majority voting rules in the Council of
Ministers.'83 The power index methodology is, in many respects, an ap-
proach focused on formal political power and consistent with the
traditional view of IGOs as informational clearing houses rather than as
governing structures. 184
Critics of the power index view have charged the methodology was
incomplete, ignoring the power of institutions themselves to influence
outcomes. Instead of focusing on voting, they argued, one should focus
on how the legislative agenda is set prior to final votes.'85 An explicitly
institutional approach, agenda-setting examines the discretionary power
of an IGO to develop the legislation that it wants, "the ability to make
proposals that are difficult to amend."'86 To illustrate these contrasting
183. George Tsebelis & Geoffrey Garrett, Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices, and
Decision Making in the European Union, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 345, 347 (1996) ("From
the power indices perspective, the ability of a government to influence Council deliberations
is a function of the portion of all mathematically possible 'winning' qualified majority coali-
tions to which it is pivotal (i.e., those coalitions that would cease to attain the qualified
majority threshold if the government defected).").
184. Geoffrey Garrett charges that many studies assume "institutions associated with
international cooperation have little impact on the political structure of the international sys-
tem and represent little or no challenge to the sovereignty of nation-states." Geoffrey Garrett,
International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal
Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533, 535 (1992) ("The common understanding of the role of interna-
tional institutions is that they monitor the behavior of participants in cooperative agreements
and paint 'scarlet letters' on transgressors .... Thus, no substantive political authority is seen
to be delegated to international institutions.").
185. Their approach, by contrast, "analyzes European decision making in terms of the
strategic interactions among the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament based
on the policy preferences of actors in these institutions and on the location of agenda-setting
power and veto power under the EU's various legislative procedures." Tsebelis and Garrett,
supra note 183, at 346.
186. See Tsebelis and Garrett, supra note 183, at 346. See also Robert Cooter & Josef
Drexl, The Logic of Power in the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the
Division of Powers, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 307, 313 (1994); George Tsebelis, The Power
of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 128, 131
(1994). Tsebelis argues that:
Agenda-setting players have powers when it is impossible, difficult, or costly for
decision makers to modify their proposals. Modification of proposals may be pre-
cluded by the prevailing institutions... Agenda setters also have power if the
deciding body is impatient, that is, if it pays a price as long as there is no agree-
ment. Impatience creates an asymmetry in favor of the proposal of the agenda setter
and against its modifications.
Tsebelis, supra, at 131.
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analytical methodologies in a U.S. context, a power index analysis
would examine floor votes of Senators while an agenda-setting approach
would focus on how specific proposals by committees and subcommit-
tees reach the floor for a vote.'87
Power indices also failed to explain the seemingly unreasonable
outcomes when the EU's Council of Ministers would adopt more
stringent laws than those in place in any single Member country.'88 In
seminal papers by Tsebelis and Garrett, they argued that the explanation
lay in the role of the Commission, and particularly that of the European
Parliament, in setting the agenda for the Council of Ministers.'89 As a
result of the legislative processes created by the Single European Act,
these institutions had the power to place items on the legislative agenda
that the Council would not otherwise have considered and could amend
only with difficulty.' 9° There is still lively debate about which EU
institution truly sets the Council's legislative agenda,' 9' but with a clear
187. See Tsebelis & Garrett, supra note 183, at 358 ("[O]ne cannot analyze qualified
majority voting in the Council without knowing how the agenda on which the Council delib-
erates is set.").
188. More precisely, they sought to explain why legislation following the Single Euro-
pean Act "often imposes on members states EU standards that are considerably more stringent
than the pivotal government under qualified majority voting in the Council would prefer."
Tsebelis & Garrett, supra note 183, at 346. The example of auto emissions is a case in point.
189. See Garrett, supra note 184; Tsebelis, supra note 186; Tsebelis & Garrett, supra
note 183.
190. Tsebelis, supra note 186, at 131 ("It is more difficult for the Council to modify a
Parliamentary proposal (provided it is accepted by the Commission) than to accept it.").
191. Some have argued that the Council effectively sets its own agenda.
Under the Luxembourg compromise that effectively governed decisions making in
the EU from at least 1966 until 1986, the Council of Ministers dominated the pol-
icy-making process. Although the formal right to propose lay exclusively with the
Commission, proposals could only become law if they were supported unanimously
in the Council. This effectively gave all the decision-making power to the govern-
ment with the least interest in changing the status quo [i.e. veto power]...
Codecision does grant the Parliament veto power over internal market issues. But it
also makes the Council the effective agenda-setter, while limiting the role of the
Commission.
Tsebelis & Garrett, supra note 183, at 352-53.
Others contend that the Commission is the agenda-setter because the Commission has
discretion to introduce legislation rejected by the European Parliament. If this legislation is
introduced, the Council "can overrule the rejection by unanimity.... A proposal by the
Commission is required to initiate the legislative process, and it is the Commission's proposal
that the Council accepts by qualified majority or modifies by unanimity." Tsebelis, supra note
186, at 130. See also Garrett, supra note 184, at 550 (arguing that the commission's "agenda-
setting role" gives it "considerable power" because "[i]f the commission asserts that a matter
pertains to the internal market, its decision stands unless challenged by a member of the coun-
cil. If a simple majority of council members agree with the commission, voting is taken by a
qualified majority.").
Yet others place the role of agenda-setter in the Parliament:
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acknowledgment of the critically important role played by Parliamentary
committees and the EU Commission in determining the contours and
shape of the legislation that the Council votes on.112
The complex relations among the European Parliament, Commis-
sion, and Council, and therefore the EU model of agenda-setting, do not,
of course, precisely correspond to the OECD. The key insight of the EU
scholarship, however, remains relevant-political institutions exercise
considerable power when they can set the agendas of other decision-
making institutions. There are degrees, of course, of agenda-setting
power. In the case of U.S. Supreme Court nominees, the President is an
absolute agenda-setter because the legislative choice is fixed and the
Senate may only vote yes or no on the President's nominee. The Euro-
pean Parliament, by contrast, is a conditional agenda-setter because its
ability to determine the legislative choices by the Council is not abso-
lute.' 93 The OECD's role as agenda-setter is significant, as well, but more
conditional and indirect than the Parliament's. In IGOs that are less leg-
islative than those in the EU (i.e., most IGOs), agenda-setting takes
place in two stages-first through nations' choice of IGOs to lead on
issues, and second through IGOs' influence on the agendas of other
IGOs.
1. IGO Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is an important aspect of litigation in America, as
parties seek jurisdictions most favorable to their position, and it is no
less important in the international community. As Krause and Nye have
observed,
194
"The change from consultation to cooperation, and from cooperation to co-
decision, decreases the power of the Commission. Its power decreases because it
must anticipate objections by two bodies (Council and Parliament) when proposing
legislation. The Commission has a smaller range of alternatives from which to
frame proposals that will actually become law."
Cooter & Drexl, supra note 186, at 313. See also Peter Moser, The European Parliament
as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis, 90 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 834 (1994) (summarizing Tsebelis's argument that "the European Parliament
(EP) has an important effect on EU decisions due to its power as a conditional agenda setter"
and Tsebelis's "claims that the EP can place items on the legislative agenda which would not
otherwise be considered and that such amendments can sometimes result in more integration
than would otherwise be chosen.").
192. See Tsebelis, supra note 186, at 139 (concluding that "European integration hap-
pens, among other reasons, because national governments have built institutions attributing
conditional agenda-setting power to supranational actors").
193. Tsebelis & Garrett, supra note 183, at 354 (noting that under the Cooperation Pro-
cedure the Commission must accept the Parliament's proposal before it is presented to the
Council, which happens for three out of four amendments).
194. Krause & Nye, supra note 4, at 336-37.
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Too little attention is paid to the political process by which
agendas are set in world politics. The choice of organizational
arena often has an important effect on setting the agenda.
Moreover, the different jurisdictional scope and the differing
composition of delegations to different organizations frequently
result in quite different distributions of influence and outcomes.
The same issue may come out quite differently in the GATT
than in UNCTAD. States try to steer issues to power arenas
more favorable to their preferred outcomes.
What does an IGO need to develop a meaningful agreement? It
needs a formal structure to hammer out differences, information, and key
players at the table. Many IGOs satisfy these three requirements. What
provides the OECD's comparative advantage over competing IGOs
working on the same issues? The OECD's experience in developing
Recommendations and Directives evidences the formal structure to reach
agreement. Its formidable technical expertise and research capacity pro-
vide the necessary information. And not just any information. The
OECD quite deliberately brings an economic perspective to policy is-
sues. The other defining feature of the OECD, and its competitive
advantage over other IGOs working on the same issues, is its member-
ship. The term "OECD nations" clearly conveys images of wealthy
industrialized countries, of a rich man's club, just as UNCTAD denotes
images of developing countries with export-based economies. The
OECD was chosen in part as the negotiating forum for the MAI because
of its in-house expertise, but its members' commitment to economic lib-
eralization was surely significant as well. Negotiations on the MAI
commenced at the OECD only after earlier attempts to negotiate an MAI
at the broader-based WTO had failed.' 95 Similarly, negotiation of the
OECD Guidelines began at the OECD during the same period in which
efforts to develop corporate codes of the conduct at the U.N. became
blocked. 96 Continuing negotiation at the OECD ensured not only a
greater likelihood of reaching a final agreement, but an agreement that
promoted economic liberalism.
2. Setting Other IGOs' Agendas
In practical terms, conditional agenda-setting power means that the
policy contours change little once they leave the institution. While the
choice of forum plays a large role in determining the substantive nature
of the work program, a more subtle form of agenda-setting takes place
195. See discussion supra note 115.
196. See discussion supra text accompanying note 58.
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when an IGO influences the actions of other IGOs. The OECD's influ-
ence on agenda-setting is least direct in its role as management
consultant. But make no mistake: the OECD's vibrant research network
acts as an advocacy network. Because the organization's breadth runs
deep and because its findings are well respected in the OECD area, its
conclusions based on empirical research carry weight. This reputation
provides the OECD with credibility in the politics of international eco-
nomic relations that few, if any, other IGOs have. Ironically, as
evidenced by the Labour Standards Study, this is particularly the case
when it ventures outside its traditional domain into social fields. The
OECD's research on core labor rights fed directly into the ILO's Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
The OECD's research capacity is unquestionably strong, and will
surely continue to inform policy development whether in-house or at
another IGO. But it can potentially prove even more potent when it
shades into a legislative function. 97 In a number of instances, the
OECD's research has led to agreements among Member countries re-
sulting in soft or hard international law at the OECD and subsequently at
other IGOs. The study of transfrontier movements in hazardous waste
led to OECD decisions culminating in negotiation at the U.N. Environ-
ment Program of the Basel Convention.98  The OECD's
recommendations and decisions on bribery led to the UN's Declaration
on the same subject.' 99 While the MAI was a stand-alone agreement, the
European Union (and presumably other members) intended for it to be-
come incorporated into the WTO framework and, but for NGO
interventions, would likely have followed the same agenda-setting path
as the OECD's work on hazardous waste and bribery. Importantly, these
substantive agreements, while not identical, were very similar to their
OECD precursors."
This strategy of conditional agenda-setting, though, presents a curi-
ous paradox in the context of globalization. The OECD's restricted
197. While this is a powerful combination, there is a downside to the synergy of re-
search and legislation because the potential exists for the appearance, if not the fact, of biased
research to support a predetermined result. While the analogy is imperfect, there is a danger in
these instances of the prosecutor acting as jury. It is instructive to note, for example, that the
ILO's research institute does not serve a governing body. At the domestic level, as well, the
Congressional Budget Office carries more influence than the Office of Management and
Budget precisely because of its apparent independence from partisan political influences.
198. See discussion supra note 128.
199. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
200, Interestingly, the limits of the OECD's agenda-setting power have become evident
in subsequent Conferences of the Parties to the Basel Convention that have passed amend-
ments much tougher than the OECD's requirements. See HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE,
supra note 5, at 874-76 (discussing the Basel Ban).
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membership makes agreement potentially easier to achieve, at least in
principle, since the primary opposition to linkages between liberalization
measures and social protections comes from developing countries. Yet,
while the OECD's exclusion of developing countries makes such agree-
ments more likely, it would seemingly make them less useful both
because the agreements apply only within the OECD area and the OECD
lacks the authority among developing countries it enjoys in developed
countries.
The "build it and they will come" strategy of negotiation followed in
the MAI, Basel Convention, and other examples cited in this article,
though, clearly shows that an expanded membership may not be neces-
sary to set the agendas of other IGOs. While the OECD's restricted
membership allows it to reach agreements that could not be brokered in
more inclusive fora, once such agreements have been completed it can
provide the impetus and grounding for development of treaties and con-
ventions at other IGOs. This strategy of reaching agreement at the
OECD and then passing the adopted text to IGOs with broader member-
ship is one of foundation-laying, though it can equally be viewed as
strategic preemption.
Much as a small negotiating committee exercises enormous influ-
ence by brokering deals that are then passed to the plenary for further
discussion and potential adoption,' by brokering an agreement among
its members and then offering it to outside parties (either with no chance
of amendment, as in the MAI case, or for development of a more com-
prehensive agreement, as with the Basel Convention) the scope of
possible compromises is effectively set. The reason that the agendas
coming from the OECD can act as conditional agendas for other IGOs
is, at the risk of being redundant, because they are coming from the
OECD. The organization's membership comprises powerful countries.
No one would argue, for example, that UNCTAD acts as a conditional
agenda setter. Put simply, when the OECD Member countries arrive at a
common position, IGOs take notice. This can be viewed as a form of
agenda-setting that results not only from communities of influence (i.e.,
transnational experts arriving at a common position and extending their
influence to other international institutions) but also from sheer num-
bers. If OECD Member countries can form a common position (even
absent a formal agreement), they represent a considerable voting bloc in
other IGOs. As Rob Housman has observed:
201. See, e.g., HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE, supra note 5, at 299-303 (excerpting
Ambassador Tommy Koh's description of how he used a de facto steering committee to drive
negotiation of the Earth Summit negotiations).
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The OECD is of special importance to trade policy making be-
cause of the manner in which it is used by developed
countries-the most powerful nations in international trade-to
develop common positions to advance through the GATT. The
closed-door nature of OECD proceedings, and its at times hos-
tile attitude toward providing greater participation, allows for
the development of OECD policies that do not necessarily re-
flect the views of the citizens of its member nations.2°2
And IGOs take even more notice when a transnational group of ex-
perts, perhaps even an epistemic community, arrives at a common
position, extending the community of influence among powerful coun-
tries to other international institutions.
This strategy of conditional agenda-setting, then, relies on the im-
portance of path dependence in fixing the trajectory for future
development. There are, of course, limits to such a strategy. The
OECD's ability to set agendas is substantially weakened if the Member
countries cannot agree amongst themselves, the competing IGOs have
the capacity to broker separate agreements, or there exist few incentives
for other countries to follow the OECD's lead.
CONCLUSION-CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
Consider the changes since the OEEC's founding in 1948. The Cold
War has ended. Commerce has become increasingly global. Regional
bodies continue to grow, in some cases rivaling the authority of national
governments, and a sophisticated, influential, and decentralized universe
of nongovernmental bodies exercises considerable influence on national
and international policies. The OECD is uniquely well placed to thrive
in this new world, but two of its distinguishing features-its restricted
membership and lack of transparency-will come under increasing
strain as the OECD seeks to meet the challenges of an international
economy strikingly different than at the time of the its founding almost
40 years ago.203
202. Housman, supra note 8, at 744. During my time at the OECD, for example, the En-
vironment Directorate held a special meeting of its Environment Committee to prepare for the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development. While agreement was not reached on a
number of issues (particularly the Convention on Biological Diversity), this process devel-
oped a number of common policy positions among the Member countries. Housman's
observation has been echoed by a member of TUAC who, in reviewing a draft of this Article,
noted that "the Trade Committee is basically the industrialised country caucus for the WTO."
203. Basic issues such as this were at the heart of the conflict in 1994 when the United
States demanded that Jean-Claude Paye not continue for a third term as Secretary-General of
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Important as its research and advocacy roles are, the core identity of
the OECD lies in its restricted membership. However, like-mindedness
comes at a cost. Within the OECD area, the organization is largely
viewed as an authoritative body. This respect for the institution, though,
is not universal among developing countries. 20' And in the field of labor
rights the major outstanding issues necessarily require developing coun-
try involvement. Where are labor rights of concern? Presumably not in
OECD countries, at least not core labor rights. Yet the OECD's re-
stricted membership, on its face, presents a significant obstacle to large-
scale, inclusive initiatives. One might argue that, notwithstanding its
occasional success as a conditional agenda-setter, if the OECD seeks
consistently to influence global labor issues, it will need to reconsider its
composition. The advent of globalization may create, in fact, an impetus
to greatly expand the OECD's membership.
The GATT provides an interesting analogy in this regard. When the
GATT was adopted in 1947, its initial and subsequent members were
like-minded toward the importance of liberalizing trade and reducing
tariffs. If the OECD seeks to further influence labor rights and other
global issues, one might contend that it should premise membership on
acceptance of market economies rather than the additional, unspoken
requirements of wealth or influence. With the expansion of membership
since the early 1990s from clearly first world, wealthy countries to
emerging economies such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak
Republics, the preconditions for OECD accession have blurred. If Mex-
ico can join, why not Thailand or Egypt? One might argue that Mexico's
trade ties to the United States through NAFTA and the East European
countries' potential membership in the EU place them in a special cate-
gory, but these are hardly compelling rationales.
The OECD certainly has outreach experience in some of its
divisions. The Center for Cooperation with Non-Members (CCNM)
assists approximately 70 non-Member countries through workshops and
peer review exercises, often working with other IGOs such as the ILO,
World Bank, and non-Member country ministries.0 5 But relations with
the OECD. See, e.g., Alan Friedman, Casting a Stronger Role for OECD, With New Priori-
ties, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), June 6, 1994, available at LEXIS, All
Sources, News Library.
204. At a workshop where this paper was presented, for example, an official from
Egyptian embassy argued that, in the eyes of developing countries, decisions from the ILO
and UNCTAD are more legitimate than those from the OECD. Interview with Mohammad
Tawfik, Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, in Geneva, Switzerland (June 25, 1999).
205. In its 2000 work program, for example, CCNM hosted workshops (supported by
the ILO and World Bank) with federal and sub-national Russian authorities to publish a re-
view on the labor market and social policies in the Russian Federation. See CENTRE FOR CO-
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non-Members are a far cry from the authority and status of membership.
Put simply, as the number of OECD nations increases, the meaning of
OECD membership may well have to change, as well, yet this places at
risk the OECD's comparative advantages as an IGO. Expanding the
OECD's membership makes it that much harder to establish a
community of like-minded officials and experts. The net result could
well be a hindrance to the creation of communities of influence and a
weakening of the OECD's conditional agenda-setting power.206
While the onset of globalization brings into question the breadth of
OECD membership, it clearly forces reconsideration of the institution's
relations with civil society. While the need for better outreach and or-
ganization was certainly evident in the context of labor and the MAI
experience, a more recent OECD conference made it starkly clear. This
past June, the OECD and Italian government co-sponsored an unremark-
able conference in Bologna entitled "Enhancing the Competitiveness of
Small and Medium Enterprises in the Global Economy." What was re-
markable was the 1,500 protesters that needed to be restrained by the
police. Like it or not, the OECD and its activities have become a visible
. • 207
symbol of globalization and its discontents.
Following the MAI experience, NGOs have laid claim to a strong
voice, if not a place, in international negotiations. This claim has been
bolstered by recent actions by other IGOs, under pressure from influen-
OPERATION WITH NON-MEMBERS, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, CCNM 2000: INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES 69 (2000); Email from
Marilyn Yakowitz, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, to James Salzman, Associate
Professor, Washington College of Law (Sept. 27, 2000) (on file with author).
206. In this regard, it is interesting to note that during the MAI negotiations Mexico
would often claim to speak on behalf of developing countries, apparently to the intense irrita-
tion of the other Member countries.
207. As a newspaper correspondent reported,
Stefano and Alice came to Via Rizzoli at I a.m. with their sleeping bags. At 5 a.m.
this morning, they, along with some five hundred youth, tried to push their way
through to the Piazza Maggiore, but were restrained by some of the 4,000 police-
men. They have come here from Venice to protest against an international
conference on "Small and Medium Businesses," organised by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Italian authorities.
"We want to protest against globalisation, against the savage capitalism this phe-
nomenon has unleashed. The OECD, the WTO and other international
organisations are all at the service of greedy multinationals. We have no more con-
trol left on our lives. They decide what we wear, what we eat. This must stop," says
Alice, a student of politics at Palermo University.
Vaiju Naravane, Anti-Globalisation Protests at OECD Summit, HINDU, June 15, 2000,
available at http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2000/06/15/stories/03150007.htm (last
modified June 14, 2000). See also Bruce Johnston, Rioters and Police Clash Near OECD
Conference, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 15, 2000, at 19.
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tial countries. In July 1998, the Director-General of the WTO announced
steps to strengthen discussion and consultations with civil society. This
likely was in response to President Clinton's call two months earlier, at
the GATT's fiftieth birthday proceedings, for the WTO "to open its
doors to the participation of the public" and to similar statements by the
European Commission. °8
What role, then, should NGOs play in influencing multilateral nego-
tiations at the OECD and other IGOs? The revised MAI model ensured
NGOs access to most negotiating texts and periodic opportunities to ad-
dress the negotiators. Some U.N. negotiations have gone even farther,
asking NGOs to select one of their members to participate in a non-
voting capacity. In this regard, one could imagine a concentric circle
approach to treaty negotiations and conferences of the parties, where
some NGOs are provided increased access and influence based on cer-
tain criteria.
There may be an inherent conflict for the OECD, however, in its ef-
forts to be both transparent to outside groups and a closed-shop
discussion forum for members. During the MAI negotiations, for exam-
ple, the OECD tried to be open about its activities relating to the MAI
but refused to release negotiation documents. The reason for this may be
obvious-negotiations cannot meaningfully take place behind closed
doors if the detailed substance of the negotiations is public knowledge-
but it reinforces charges of secrecy. There also remains serious resis-
tance to granting any special status to NGOs. As David Henderson, the
former Director of the OECD's Economics and Statistics Directorate and
close observer of the MAI negotiations, has written:
No non-governmental organisation, whether speaking for busi-
ness enterprises, trade unions or professional bodies, 'public
interest' concerns, or any other groups, has a valid claim in its
own right to active participation in proceedings where the re-
sponsibility for decisions and outcome rests, and has to rest,
with the governments of national sovereign states.
Professor David Robertson states the case more strongly:
[T]he role of NGOs in the MAI story is disturbing. There is a risk
that in future other international negotiations, including those in
the World Trade Organisation, may be similarly disrupted by
these undisciplined and undemocratic groups.... For the first
time an official initiative to formalise international economic
208. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 58.
209. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 60.
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cooperation was defeated, in part, by a loose coalition of social
lobby groups, claiming to speak "for the people." ... Ultimately,
NGOs stand for "no go!" They aim to block progress in favor of
conserving the status quo protecting national culture, domestic
values and jobs, traditional farming, trees over people, etc.20
Condemning the influence of civil society, however, will hardly
make it go away. What might the OECD do to better engage NGOs
and preempt concerted hostile campaigns? One option would be to in-
crease the secretariat's regular briefing contacts with NGOs, as well as
TUAC and BIAC, as the Environment Directorate already does. This
routine practice of dialogue with NGOs provides warning of potential
opposition but also allows the OECD to choose its contacts and poten-
tially involve (and coopt) powerful NGOs as indirect participants
rather than committed attackers.
A more formal alternative would be to create additional structured
partners to complement TUAC and BIAC, perhaps by creating um-
brella partners for environmental, gender, and poverty NGOs. Recall
that the OECD maintains two formal links with representatives of civil
society. Even if BIAC manages to speak in a manner approaching one
voice on behalf of employers, it is still left to TUAC to represent the
range of labor stakeholders. This is clearly not sufficient today, if it
ever was, because TUAC can only legitimately claim to speak on be-
half of unionized labor. NGOs with significant interests in labor rights
represent many other economic and social actors beyond unionized
labor and employers' groups, not to mention other sectors of civil so-
ciety, such as environmentalists and human rights groups.
The OECD's current structure, in fact, provides an incentive for
trade unions and BIAC to oppose a more formalized status for other
NGOs, as their inclusion would weaken the access currently enjoyed
by the "official" OECD civil society partners. This is not to suggest
that TUAC or BIAC have actively opposed greater inclusion of other
civil society groups in OECD proceedings, but a political economy
analysis indicates why it would not be in their interests to support
210. David Robertson, Foreward to DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY
AND ITS LESSONS 1-2 (Pelham Paper No. 4, Melbourne Business School, 1999), available at
http://www.cairnsgroupfarmers.org/ni/reportspapers/mai.htm (last modified Nov. 17, 1999).
See also Brigitte Granville, Preface to HENDERSON supra note 23, at v ("Mark Twain used to
say: 'All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence, and then success is Sure.' Unfortu-
nately, the MAI affair seems to have proved his point.... It was the bien pensants who
prevailed, the NGOs with their own agenda and without any vision of the overall conse-
quences.").
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changes to the status quo that weakened their relative position as in-
siders. This phenomenon already appears to be in play at the ILO.'"
Finally, the OECD can substantively engage civil society, loosely
following the practice of notice-and-comment rulemaking under U.S.
administrative law. In fact, in a major policy shift following the de-
mise of the MAI, the OECD created a public consultation process. As
described earlier, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
were recently revised."' Using the new process, the OECD posted a
draft text on the web and invited public comments. Comments were
submitted by businesses, labor unions, environmental groups, aca-
demic institutions, individuals, and non-Member countries; these, too,
were posted on the web for all to see. A second draft text, influenced
by these comments, was posted and subject to a similar round of pub-
lic comment.23 CIME also permitted the Chairman of the Review to
work with an informal consultation group of TUAC, BIAC and se-
lected NGOs.2 4
Changing the mindset of this exclusive and closed organization
will not be easy. Its historically low-profile, technocratic culture seems
ill-fitting in the jarring glare of its newly found prominence. Like it or
not, the OECD has taken on the mantle of a high-profile IGO in the
vanguard of globalization. How the OECD will respond to this
unwelcome new identity remains to be seen. Its engagements with
nongovernmental actors, though, represent encouraging steps toward
greater public accountability. These actions certainly will not satisfy
many of those who gathered in Bologna to protest the OECD and all it
has come to symbolize, but such movements toward greater
211. Interview with Mohammed Tawfik, Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, in
Geneva, Switzerland (June 25, 1999).
212. See discussion supra notes 62-64.
213. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Issues Re-
vised Draft of Its Guidelines for Multinationals for Further Comment, at http://
www.oecd.org/media/release/nwOO-27a.htm (Mar. 15, 2000). CIME also formally invited the
ILO to all Working Party meetings.
214. The Chair of the OECD Working Party on the Review (Marinus Sikkel of the
Netherlands) directed an informal process of consultation with TUAC, BIAC, a small number
of NGOs and OECD staff known as the Hague Process. Sikkel invited these groups to a first
brainstorming meeting in the Hague with the understanding that the participants spoke in a
personal capacity. Before each subsequent meeting the group was given a draft of a paper
prepared by Sikkel and DAFFE staff (but which had not yet been sent to governments). On
the basis of the group's discussions and brainstorming, the draft was then revised and then
sent to governments. The last meeting in Amsterdam was expanded to include three members
from TUAC, three from BIAC, three NGOs, Sikkel and DAFFE staff, and government repre-
sentatives from the United States, United Kingdom and Mexico. The Hague Process operated
in many respects like a focus group. The members had no mandate to bind their organizations,
but their reactions and creative drafting provided insights (and perhaps buy-in) that would not
otherwise have been apparent.
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transparency will increase the sensitivity of the OECD to significant
social issues, further maturing its sense of mission in a world so
different from the one its founders envisaged.
